

**RESULTS REVIEW - R2**

**USAID/NIGER**

**1995**

**Revised April 1996**

## SECTION I: FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

**Aims:** The United States places democratization and sustainable economic development at the center of its policy objectives for Africa. In view of this policy, and based on consultations with many Nigeriens, U.S. partners, and other donors, the sustainable development vision and strategic objectives adopted by the U.S. Mission are:<sup>1</sup>

*A healthier population growing at a slower rate, with improved rural production based on better conservation of the environment.*

- *Objective 1: Increased use of selected family planning and maternal/child health (FP/MCH) services and disaster mitigation practices.*
- *Objective 2: More decentralized financial services and an improved environment for productivity.*
- *Objective 3: Sustained widespread adoption of management practices improving the conservation and productive use of Niger's forests, fields, waters, and pastures.*

**Rationale:** Our program aims to hasten Niger's evolution towards a broad-based, free market economy based on democratic principles. Improving health and child survival will eventually encourage lower fertility and improve capacities for economic production. Slowing population growth will, in the long run, reduce pressure on the country's fragile natural resource base and improve its capability to meet demands in the social sectors. Improved natural resources management is the key to sustainable, increased rural production. Better forecasting and response to disasters, especially food related emergencies during periodic droughts, will allow Nigeriens to better cope with these crises and decrease the need for U.S. assistance. The U.S. program has become increasingly integrated, with each objective intended to reinforce progress in the others; more geographic concentration of activities is helping make this possible. Almost 25% of USAID program funds are used for training in support of the strategic objectives. Activities under each objective include strong complementary emphasis on improving opportunities for women and building local democratic structures.

**Progress:** The USAID program indicators showed real progress towards our eight-year objectives in 1995, as detailed in Section II.<sup>2</sup> Overall progress at the vision level included continued vitality of the rural informal sector and growth in rural production and incomes. In 1994, a much needed regional currency devaluation, excellent rains, and the overvaluation of the Nigerian (Niger's main trading partner) naira had combined to boost Niger's agriculture sector growth by about 8.5% in real terms and

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<sup>1</sup> USAID's Niger Country Strategic Plan (CSP, 1995-2002), approved in April 1995, forms the basis for this Results Review (R2) portion of the 1995 Results Review and Resource Request (R4) report. Other useful references include USAID/Niger's FY 1997 Congressional Presentation, and last year's 1994 USAID/Niger Assessment of Program Impact.

<sup>2</sup> This Review covers calendar year 1995 though wherever possible—as with the time frame in last year's USAID/Niger 1994 Assessment of Program Impact—information is the most current available, often through end of February 1996.

increased incomes for many among the 85% of the population living in rural areas. Farmers produced a near record grain harvest despite only average rainfall, but exports were impeded by some revaluation of the FCFA currency and readjusted naira exchange rates. In 1995, growth of rural production continued at about 3% in real terms. The GON reached preliminary agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions—the closest the country has come in years to full resumption of credit accords. Child immunization improved, two major infectious disease epidemics were mastered, and use of family planning increased. Policies and programs for better conservation of the environment expanded, especially for forests, and new local, non-governmental organizations came into being to exploit local and donor resources for conservation. Though voter turn-out was not high, a well-run, free and fair multi-party election in January 1995 led to seating of a new National Assembly in early February and a new government in late April.

For most Nigeriens, relatively favorable rainfall throughout most of the country was the best news of the year. Though locust swarms increased in 1995 as predicted, they and other pests did not pose large problems due to very successful monitoring and timely controls. The 2.2 million metric tons (MT) gross harvest of millet and sorghum was among the highest recorded—25% above the average of the years, 1989-1993. The national cereals stocks balance for 1995 provided a surplus of approximately 170,000 tons.<sup>3</sup> Probably because of continuing good harvests, reported levels of malnutrition among children presenting to health centers continued to fall.<sup>4</sup> Production of cowpeas and peanuts for cash sales also was unusually high. Nevertheless, poor rainfall in some areas combined with localized pest problems and insecurity in the north led to an estimated 600,000 low income people being judged "moderately vulnerable to potential food shortages" and requiring assistance. Conditions for pasturage were very poor in the northern region and livestock did not fair well in recent months. GON mitigation activities are fully mobilized and are providing needed assistance with support from USAID and other bilateral donors.

Low revenues from steadily declining uranium income and limited collection of taxes and customs have been chronic fiscal constraints since the early 1980s. Finding ways to increase revenues and lower expenditures is the critical challenge facing government and the key requisite to reaching an agreement with the IMF on an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). In December 1995, the GON negotiated the main details of an accord with the IMF to gain access to ESAF credits and on the draft of a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) with the World Bank. Although until recently Niger had engaged in little systematic macro-economic analysis or effective fiscal policy-making, USAID assistance substantially improved this capacity over the past year with numerous high quality policy studies with or for the Ministry of Plan. USAID technical assistance contributed importantly to GON preparations of their macro-economic data for the IMF and the PFP in which mid-term strategic objectives and economic policy measures were detailed; judgements by the IMF/World Bank team were very positive for agreements (and about the technical assistance).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The 1995 net harvest was estimated at about 2.0 million metric tons (MMT). The gross harvest in 1994—an exceptionally good year for rainfall (and stimulation by very favorable exchange rates with Nigeria)—was about 2.4 MMT, and net was about 2.2 MMT. Also, see NIAMEY 00259, 19Jan96: "FEWS/NIGER: POST-HARVEST FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT". GON estimated a slight deficit, due to higher assumptions of average losses within households and soon after the coup launched an appeal to donors for about 130,000 MT of grain citing evidence that vulnerabilities were rising.

The evidence of declining malnutrition is welcome, but the reliability of the data needs to be verified before overly optimistic conclusions can be drawn.

<sup>5</sup> The GON last year found ways to reduce expenditures, including reducing the number of Ministries and keeping the strong unions engaged in dialogue about reducing the wage bill. The National Assembly considered proposals to increase revenues through more effective levies on personal income and property, better

USAID and the GON in 1995 were successful in meeting conditions precedent (CPs) for all active non-project assistance agreements. USAID disbursed \$7.8 million during the year as CPs were met in health, natural resource management, disaster preparedness and mitigation, and economic reform. Most of these funds went to local counterpart accounts that, as indicated in Section II, are funding local non-governmental community organizations working in those sectors, and supporting mission objectives such as cost recovery, a national health information system and procurement of generic drugs, and a national disaster early warning and response system. The non-project assistance this year also helped leverage several million dollars of additional external assistance.

In April 1995, the GON negotiated a peace accord that greatly reduced hostilities in Niger's north and moved the country toward resolving the costly Tuareg Rebellion. Civilian transport and trade are operating again in the north and the number of armed attacks and overall banditry, mostly affecting the local population, continued to decline. USAID and other donors, including the French Cooperation, and the European Union, resumed activities in northern Departments.

Improvement in women's status remains precarious though some women play important roles in national life. Women now almost invariably are members and have seats on governing committees of urban and rural groups, and occupy some senior civil service appointments. Yet the number of women in the National Assembly had dropped from five to three members in the 1995 elections. Work on the Family Code was suspended throughout 1995 as some Islamic religious associations continued to agitate against clarifying and protecting women's legal rights. The GON included the Family Code as one of the benchmark policy issues in the PFP. Fundamentalists blockage of the contraceptive social marketing component of the family planning program proved temporary; program managers succeeded in engaging Islamic association leaders in the public health rationale and in helping to develop media campaigns.<sup>6</sup>

USAID/Niger, as one of a few "Country Experimental Laboratories" (CELs), undertook extensive reengineering of its program and management during 1995, resulting in numerous changes in approach, most significantly the engagement of Nigeriens more deeply than ever before in developing this mission's Results Framework and Results Package Teams. Numerous reports on how this was done and judgements about its effect on program performance are summarized in Section III.

**Problems:** Good progress towards USAID's vision, Objectives, and expected Results, however, cannot mask Niger's critical problems. Despite growth in rural production, continuing decline in the formal sector led the overall economy to only slight growth in 1995 and—though past negative trends lessened somewhat—government's chronic fiscal problems continued as the salary wage bill usually exceeded total GON revenues. Intense, instructive experience in democratic governance was overshadowed by what many Nigeriens came to think of as almost intractable political stalemates throughout the year. Niger's new democracy—closely modeled on France's Fifth Republic—was on the ropes from the day

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collection of customs, and application of sales and/or value added taxes. The impasse in 1994 and 1995 over how to pay salaries and support other recurrent costs probably cannot be solved with progressively declining revenues, regardless of modest levels of savings from reducing an already small (though comparatively quite highly paid) public sector. The GON estimates that no more than 80,000 people work in the formal sector (paying taxes). That number is declining, both from some reductions in the approximately 38,000 public sector employees and from decline in the size of the formal private sector. Continuing budgetary shortfalls could imply chronic bankruptcy for the public sector, erratic repayments to international lending institutions, and eventually an erosion of critical services like electricity and telecommunications. The IMF/WB team judgement in December 1995 was that the GON was redressing its fiscal problems.

<sup>6</sup> Last year's API provided extensive reporting and analysis on the status of women in Niger. Progress and problems highlighted there largely held true through 1995.

after the January 1995 legislative elections. An alliance of parties opposed to President Ousmane's coalition established a functional majority in the National Assembly and imposed their choice of Prime Minister on the President. The President and the Prime Minister, who was allied with the President of the National Assembly, took uncompromising stances on issues involving the exercise of power and authority. Public sector employees and teachers suffered long delays in salary payment and went without pay in late 1995.<sup>7</sup> On the surface, however, everyday life in Niger in 1995 went on peacefully. Conflicts and tension within the "political" class were remote for most citizens, only engaging the small urban elite.<sup>8</sup>

A military *coup d'etat* punctured this surface calm on 27 January 1996. Its leaders claimed they were provoked by the necessity to end the political stalemate that would lead to political and ethnic polarization and which risked inciting civil war. The U.S. does not support this assessment. The three contending political leaders were placed under house arrest and the constitution and political parties were suspended. Some Nigeriens have acknowledged that a *coup d'etat* was not the ideal means for breaking the impasse that had been plaguing their government. Yet, when considering the economic and political realities with which they were faced, it is easy to see how some Nigeriens could support the coup; virtually everyone now agrees that returning the old government to power is no longer possible or desirable. The country's new leaders are experienced senior officers who avowedly are determined to set Niger on a path toward a more successful democratic future. They have installed a civilian government that retained key ministers from the deposed government, but held on to power through an all-military *Council de Salut National* (CSN), whose President is also Head of State. They pledged a transitional administration, and appointed a substitute assembly of former leaders of government, "traditional" leaders, and representatives of NGOs, human rights and women's groups. This council was charged with drawing up revisions to the constitution and electoral code with a view to swift restoration of democratic government. The press remained free. Primary and secondary schools are open. Human rights groups continued their activities and reported no significant violations. The deposed leaders gave media interviews, voiced support for the military's transition program, and urged the international community to understand the peculiar nuances of the Niger situation. Though Niger's coup was yet another abrupt reminder of the fragility of the modern nation state in this region, it was not—at least so far in its early features—a military takeover like others in Africa.<sup>9</sup>

**Donor responses:** Niger in recent years has depended upon **bilateral** donors for roughly 35% of its revenues for public sector operations and for about 80% of its development investment—a formidable structural weakness, the more so considering disbursements of multi-lateral loans and grants bring reliance on total external concessional aid to about 60% for operations and 100% for development.

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<sup>7</sup> As also noted last year, the deepening crisis in the school system portends a possible disaster for the development of Nigerien human resources. Education and basic literacy levels are already among the lowest worldwide. The performance of the school system had already been in decline for several years, before the succession of stoppages, strikes and cancelled academic years. Most students missed two to three successive years of schooling—1992 to 1994. The entire educational sector, including both students and teachers from primary to university levels seems demobilized and demoralized. Surveys and other information suggest that adults in rural areas are turning away from education in the French language to religious schools, given the poor performance of the public sector and the lack of ready employment for graduates, who now often become marginal, unemployed youth. The implications for the quality of future civil and private sector services, and the impact on the general, non-literate population, are disturbing.

<sup>8</sup> "Crisis in the Young Democracy", in USAID/Niger's 1994 API also provides good background to the 1995 situation.

<sup>9</sup> Communication problems are a critical impediment to Nigeriens' participation in a democratic state. Literacy rates in French, the main language of government, probably do not exceed 20% (mostly urban and male). The reach of the press and television are very limited. Transistor radios are popular (possessed mostly only by males) and effective for news and promulgating decrees in local languages—but, its use has never been shown inherently to favor spread of democratic ideals. Basic "infrastructure" is extremely limited; e.g., the National Assembly lacks even one telephone. External constitutional models may be more limiting than we thought. As in France, Assembly deputies were selected by their parties and were not directly accountable to their constituents.

Following the coup, France (about \$55 million per year), the European Union (about \$35 million), Germany and the United States (about \$20 million each), and Canada, Japan, Belgium and other European bilateral donors (altogether roughly \$55 million) quickly suspended obligations of new funds to GON and slowed or stopped activities that were not directly humanitarian in nature.<sup>10</sup> Intense donor response, along with adverse reaction from other African countries, undoubtedly played some part in the new government's decisions to accelerate its plans for a national referendum on constitutional and electoral code reforms, holding national and local elections, and reinstallation of democratic government. As of early March, these were scheduled to be completed by September 1996.<sup>11</sup>

Because of the military coup, the U.S. is required to close down its assistance program within eight months, although assistance can be resumed with restoration of democratic government (and following a U.S. Presidential Determination). Exceptions may be permitted for certain designated programs, including child survival and assistance through PVOs/NGOs. Therefore, until the expected restoration of democratic government, the Mission is proposing an assistance program reduced to legislatively permitted NGO and humanitarian assistance--mostly for child survival measures under Objective 1, and a small core of activities including non-governmental organizations under Objective 3 working in rural savings and credit and NRM for increasing rural production.

**Conclusion:** Although the challenges to Niger's evolving into an effective multi-party system of government are formidable, the underlying conditions for progressive development of a democratic form of government are favorable. The growth of an independent press and the multiplication of local, regional and national associations demonstrate the breadth of national change. There now are over 250 Non-Governmental Organizations officially recognized in Niger, up 25% from last year. USAID plays a significant role in promoting this process with its emphasis on democratic governance as a cross-cutting theme in all of its objectives. Virtually all USAID activities emphasize more local, community autonomy to manage natural resources, savings and credit, health services, and food stocks. The growth of community associations and their mobilization reflects these trends.

Difficult as Niger's fiscal and political problems are, USAID/Niger's view is that many of the events and processes in 1995--the coup excepted--continue trends and basic reforms that USAID and other donors have been urging. Nigeriens are becoming more engaged in and more experienced in political processes. Their constitutional system is being challenged and probably strengthened. The long transition period that began in the early 1990s remains almost entirely peaceful. Although it would be desirable for the GON to raise enough revenue to pay its bills, some of those expenses, particularly the bloated wage bill, must be reduced. Policies and programs for revenue collection now, however, must increasingly be based on a wider framework of political agreements within the society. Open debate--in a legislative context--has become a basis for decision-making on fiscal policy.

Nigeriens are acquiring valuable experience in new modes of participatory governance, and the U.S. has played a strong and much appreciated role in their 1991-1993 transition period and remains highly

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations organizations also provide some grant support, and loans from the Bretton Woods institutions are deemed vital to Niger's ability to stimulate economic development, if not also simply to survive by being able to borrow at critical times. To the best of our knowledge, the Bretton Woods institutions are not under legal strictures to suspend their credit programs due to military coups. For donor figures, see: PNUD, "*Rapport sur la cooperation pour le developpement, resumé de l'aide exterieure, par donateur et par secteur, 1994*"

<sup>11</sup> On 8 March, France announced full resumption of its assistance to Niger, based on judgement that the new regime would make good on its promises to hold fair elections and restore democratic government by mid-1996. We understand, however, that France's direct budgetary aid remains contingent on Niger's achieving accord with the IMF. Most bilateral donors now have resumed cooperation, though some may be delaying consideration of new obligations (e.g., Germany). Only the U.S. now plans to significantly reduce its programs and withdraw support staff.

respected.<sup>12</sup> Niger can play a strongly positive or negative role in West Africa. Prospects for restoration of democracy and subsequent resumption of U.S. development assistance must be treated seriously. U.S. development assistance is making a difference to the quality of life for many thousands of Nigeriens and contributing to long-term institutional development. As shown in the following Section II, indicators mostly show movement in the right directions.

**TABLE 1 MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS**

<b>Economic Trends</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</b>							
Real GDP in Constant Prices (annual % change)	0.5	-1.3	1.9	-0.3	0.6	2.6	1.8
GDP Per Capita (dollars)	315	292	261	280	270	280	285
Traditional Sector (in % of GDP)	68.2	70.7	71.6	75.9	75.5	75.3	76.2
Modern Private Sector (in % of GDP)	31.8	29.3	28.4	24.1	25.0	24.7	23.8
<b>Balance of Payments (in billions of FCFA)</b>							
Trade Deficit	-24.9	-34.3	-14.6	-12.7	-11.3	-10.8	-7.2
Imports, c.i.f.	-123.1	-118.9	99.5	-87.6	-81.1	-122.6	-123.2
Exports, f.o.b.	98.2	84.6	84.9	74.9	69.8	111.8	116.0
Current Account Deficit (includes official transfers)	-28.3	-25.7	-2.1	-17.6	-10.71	-10.6	-40.3
<b>Total External Debt (in \$ mn)</b>	1587	1827	1653	1711	1704	1700	1800
External Public Debt as a Percent of GDP	47.8	48.7	52.0	57.9	59.8	53.3	52.4
Debt Service After Rescheduling (in % of exports of goods and non-factory services)	19.5	17.8	16.4	22.9	26.5	27.3	-
Official Dev Assistance (millions of US\$)	288	313	241	333	262	250	-

**Data Sources:** GON Ministry of Finance and Plan, IMF, World Bank, UNDP, BCEAO

**Notes:** (1) 1995 figures are provisional estimates from the GON Ministry of Finance and Plan (MOFP), revised in late February 1996; estimates of growth in prior years recently were adjusted by the WB and MOFP; (2) import and export estimates are far from exact, but MOFP and BCEAO believe they are of good relative magnitude.

<sup>12</sup> Our assistance has been prominent in this country since the early 1960s starting with construction of the J.F. Kennedy Bridge in Niamey, one of the few to span the Niger river in many hundreds of miles and a vital economic link. Over 3,000 Peace Corps volunteers have served since that era, and typically (with missionaries) have been the only foreigners to acquire skill in the local languages. Thousands of Nigeriens have studied in the U.S.; virtually all of them have returned to Niger. Links between our countries are impressive, though not mainly commercial.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR VISION

PERFORMANCE MEASURE	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Vision: A healthier population growing at a slower rate with improved rural production and better conservation of the environment.									
A. Age-specific mortality rate <sup>1</sup> ·1q0 ·4q1 ·5q0 Data source: a,b	1992 1992 1992	123.1 222.6 318.2					√	√	
B. Total fertility rate <sup>2</sup> Data source: a	1992	7.4	7.4	7.4	<7.4>	(7.3)	(7.3) √	(7.3) √	(7.2)
C. Child malnutrition <sup>3</sup> ·Nationwide ·Selected districts ·Vulnerable areas Data source: a, c	1992 TBD TBD	16%	11%	8.2%	<7% > <sup>4</sup>		√ √ √	√ √	√ √
D. Agriculture sector growth <sup>5</sup> Data source: d, e, f	1992	0%	3.5%	8.5%	<3.0%>	(5.0%)	(5.0%)	(5.0%)	(5.0%)
E. Per capita food production <sup>6</sup> Data source: d, e, f	1986	100	114	123	<127>	(135)	(142)	(149)	(156)
<b>NOTES:</b> * Baseline values for Indicators A-C were collected through the DHS. Subsequent year data was collected through alternative data sources, when available. <sup>1</sup> Breakdowns of annual, age-specific death rates presented in the baseline figures represent calculations made during the five year period preceding the 1992 DHS survey. <sup>2</sup> Average # of children/woman, assuming current age-specific birth rates remain constant. <sup>3</sup> % of children more than two standard deviations below WHO standard weight for height. Values for malnutrition rates are among children presenting to health centers during the given year, reported to the SNIS in 1993, 1994, and 1995. (The Mission has determined that weight for age measures are not as reliable as weight for height in the context of Niger, as it is very difficult to accurately identify age.) <sup>4</sup> 1995 data are 100% for the first three quarters. Fourth quarter data not yet available. <sup>5</sup> Percent growth of all primary agricultural and livestock products. <sup>6</sup> Total CY 12-month food estimates/mid-year population estimate.									
<b>DATA SOURCE KEY (Source/Method of data collection/ Frequency of collection):</b> a = Niger Demographic and Health Survey, Sample survey, every 5 yrs. (1992, 1997) b = Niger Dicennial Census, 1988, 1998 c= <i>Système National d'Information Sanitaire</i> (SNIS-Ministry of Public Health National Health Information System), Database, Quarterly					d = International Monetary Fund e = World Bank f = GON Ministry of Plan, Compilation of district data, Continuous  <b>TARGET KEY:</b> √ = data to be collected in this year				




## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Strategic Objective 1: Increased use of selected family planning and maternal/child health (FP/MCH) and disaster mitigation practices.									
A. % of women, age 15-49, who are currently using a modern method of contraception <sup>1</sup> Data source: a	1992	2.3%	<2.6%>	<3.8%>	<4.4%> <sup>2</sup> (5.1)	(6.3%) ‡	(7.3%) √	(8.3%) ‡	(9.3%) √
B. % of women receiving medical attention (pre-natal care) during last pregnancy <sup>3</sup> Data source: a, c	1992	30%	‡	‡	‡	‡	√	√	√
C. % of children age 12-23 months who received measles immunization before 12 months of age <sup>4</sup> ·Nationwide ·Selected districts Data source: a, b, c	1992 1992 TBD	DHS-20.4% SNIS-21%	20%	27% <sup>5</sup>	43% (20%) <sup>6</sup>	(42%)	√ (46%)	(50%)	(55%)
D. % of identified vulnerable populations benefiting from emergency distributions and mitigation activities Data source: a, d	1995	28%			28%	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)
NOTES: * Data source "a", or the DHS, is a sample survey taken every 5 years. (1992, 1997, etc...) Because of the significant time gap between DHS studies, the Mission plans to establish ongoing sampling surveys, as possible, to obtain data on a more regular basis. <sup>1</sup> Contraceptive prevalence rate was estimated by taking the 1992 baseline from the DHS and multiplying it by the average annual percent increase in Couple Years of Protection (15%). Values for Indicator A can only be measured using a survey. While the DHS is only scheduled every five years, the Mission will have smaller rapid assessment surveys beginning in 1998. <sup>2</sup> The 1995 data is provided as an estimate because it was based on a small sample in one target site. A 1995 survey for Balleyara, an Operations Research site, found a CPR of 7.6%. <sup>3</sup> Further studies must be conducted before the Mission can set targets or discuss anticipated progress of this measure. <sup>4</sup> Measles immunization was selected as a preventive child survival proxy measure. Rates were calculated based on the number of immunizations given in a specific area, divided by the number of the target populations. 1996 to 1998 targets were updated to reflect early achievement of a higher than expected immunization rate. The target for 1999 remains unchanged. <sup>5</sup> Data reported in Niger's 1995 API was incomplete; measles coverage rate rose to 27% from 15% when data from all districts was available. Delays in compiling statistics was due, at least in part, to extensive government strikes. <sup>6</sup> Target of 20% assumed a baseline of 15% in 1994, which subsequently proved to be inaccurate.									
DATA SOURCE KEY (Source/ Method of data collection/ Frequency of collection): a = Niger Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Sample survey, every 5 years (1992, 1997) b = National EPI program, Service Statistics, Quarterly c = <i>Système National d'Information Sanitaire</i> (SNIS-Ministry of Public Health National Health Information System), Database, Quarterly d = <i>Système d'Alerte Précoce</i> (SAP-early warning system), Service Reports e = Directorate of Family Health, Division of Family Planning; Service Statistics, Quarterly f = PNASSP (National support for Primary Health Care Program)					g = Situation analysis, Sample survey, Biennial h = Contractor (TBD), Project reports, Quarterly j = <i>Cellule de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles</i> , Sample survey k = Department of Crop Protection, Ministry of Agriculture, GON; Records review m = Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Project, USAID; Activity reports n = Ministry of Interior, Records review, Annual  TARGET KEY: ‡ = no data collected in this year √ = data to be collected in this year † = not yet begun				

**SUMMARY:** FY95 was the final year of the two health and population projects funded by USAID/Niamey over the last decade. The most significant accomplishment was continued growth of the Contraceptive Social Marketing program, overcoming the attacks of fundamentalist Islamic parties that occurred late in 1994. The Social Marketing Program showed a 70% increase in condom distribution over the previous year. Overall CYP distributed through all distribution channels increased by 19% over the previous year.

## Measles Immunization Rates

Niger, 1988-1996



Several of the other indicators showed marked improvement over the previous year, most notably measles immunizations, which increased from 27% to 43% coverage for the target group. Part of this was due to the response to the measles epidemic that struck in February to June of this year and to

the two national Vaccination Days that were held in the fall of 1995. In addition to the programmed activities, in early 1995, Niger suffered one of the largest meningitis epidemics in the history of the world, with some 40,000 cases and 4,000 deaths reported, and an untold number of cases and deaths that passed without being officially recorded. Because of the presence of a strong health and disaster mitigation team, USAID was able to procure one million doses of meningitis vaccine within two weeks, and provide other assistance through counterpart funds.

Significant progress was made in strengthening the national early warning and disaster response in Niger. The SAP/GC at both the national and sub-regional level was trained in vulnerability analysis and capacity to develop and implement cost effective mitigation activities. In excess of 338 village level activities were undertaken, reaching at least 28% of the identified vulnerable population and transferring food for work in excess of 1,100 metric tons (MT). As a result of steps taken to meet CPs to institutionalize and strengthen the SAP/GC, \$3.5 million in NPA was disbursed into the emergency fund.


Accomplishments made by ongoing technical assistance to management within the Ministry of Health are not easily expressed in a table. The most important improvements include: enhanced capacity to manage the overall budget, counterpart funds, material inventory, personnel, pharmaceuticals, information, and national, departmental and district planning. These improvements are critical to ensuring that programs are ultimately sustainable, even if it is difficult to link inputs directly to numerical results.

**ANALYSIS:** Availability of good, reliable data remains a major problem for the SO1 team. For family planning figures, there are usually two or three different sources which are difficult to reconcile. Some changes in the figures cited in these tables are due to changing from the UNFPA calculation of CYP (e.g., 100 condoms = 1 CYP) as opposed to the more recent USAID conversion factors (150 condoms = 1 CYP). The new SO1 contractor's responsibilities will include ensuring that accurate, consistent data are available for management and results reporting.

Despite low contraceptive prevalence figures, Niger is actually making good progress. It is far ahead of where neighboring countries, like Mali and Burkina Faso, were eight years into their population programs. It is easy to forget that, as recently as 1988, contraception was not legal in Niger, but is now much more widely available, largely due to USAID policy dialogue, non-project assistance, and technical assistance.

## Couple Years of Protection

Niger, 1990-1996



DPF and '94 Target adjusted to USAID definition of CYP

The progress reported in the above table comes as the result of project assistance, but this is buttressed by activities funded through the counterpart fund account that was generated by non-project assistance. The family planning program, the National Health Information System, the Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI), and the emergency fund, among many other programs, receive much of their operating budgets from these funds.

It should be noted that measles immunization rates are used as a proxy for overall vaccination status. This is deemed to be an important indicator, particularly in the early phases of the development of an EPI program (Niger started in 1988), but is not a complete picture.

With respect to the disaster mitigation component of the Strategic Objective, progress was made toward the achievement of a well trained, transparent, credible and sustainable national body that is becoming recognized by other donors as a mechanism with nationwide capacity to be forewarned, prepared and capable of responding to rapid or slow on-set disasters. We estimate that, in this start-up year, 206,000 individuals, 75% children, benefited from the mitigation activities and 7,000 individuals benefited from emergency response interventions. These are predominantly children who lost home and food stocks due to fire, flood or displacement due to conflict. After inadequate rainfall, pest attack is the second most serious threat to the national food supply, sometimes with devastating consequences for the nutritional state of the population, especially women and children. We estimate that our direct support for crop protection of 38,500 hectares added as much as 100,000 MT to the national cereals stock.

**USAID CONTRIBUTION:** In population and family planning, USAID is the single most important donor. UNFPA makes small contributions, but provides no contraceptives. UNICEF contributes to the EPI program, but is largely dependent on other donors for the procurement of vaccines. In 1995, more than \$200,000 from the counterpart fund account was used to purchase vaccines. USAID is, to date, the dominant source of funds for the GON's SAP/GC, using NPA counterpart funds.

**LINKAGES:** Linkages with other parts of the USAID program have not yet been well developed, although many of them are planned. For example, the USAID credit program engages health care providers—especially nurses and pharmacists—to assist them in establishing practices in rural areas of Niger. The mitigation activities of the DPM-supported SAP/GC and the natural resources management programs are crucial to accomplishment of SO1 objectives in that they provide an ongoing, sustainable source of food for the most vulnerable populations—a crucial link, given that malnutrition is the main contributing factor to Niger's high infant/child mortality.

**EXPECTED PROGRESS:** The Mission had expected to have a new contractor on site by mid-March, 1996, to continue support to achievement of the agreed-upon results under the Mission's new Strategic Objective Agreement. Unfortunately, the Mission and the offerors underestimated the difficulty of preparing a performance based, re-engineered RFP and

Proposal, resulting in the need for a second solicitation. Both the USG furloughs and the January 1996 suspension of USAID assistance to Niger (due to the military coup) resulted in further delays. The result is that new activities are not expected to start until October, a delay of about six months. The Mission is certain that these lacuna are already adversely affecting results and achievement of targets. To ameliorate this impact, a variety of centrally funded projects are providing assistance in key areas. Specifically, the SOMARC project has been extended through the end of December, 1996; the Quality Assurance Project will be extended through August, 1996; and, the Partners for Health Reform project will pick up a number of activities at the central level from the NHSS prime contractor, whose contract will be completed in March, 1996. We have not yet assessed the quantitative impact of these events, and therefore do not yet wish to modify the earlier indicators of progress. With the establishment of new contracts and grants to partners to assist Niger and USAID to reach these mutual objectives, the Mission will be in a better position to manage, monitor, and predict progress towards the desired results. Despite these delays, if sufficient resources continue to be made available, the Mission is hopeful that not much momentum will be lost.

The Mission is considering two additional initiatives. Over the past year, the challenges of the delivery system for vaccines have become overwhelming, as has been evidenced by the measles and meningitis epidemics. Other donors are not providing sufficient, effective assistance. If USAID resources are available, the Mission intends to initiate a program of assistance to the national EPI program, improving cold chain, management and supervision. Similarly, with the slow increase of HIV prevalence in Niger, the Mission hopes to inaugurate a new HIV/AIDS/STD prevention program to reinforce its efforts to improve reproductive health services.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1, RESULT 1

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 1.1: Increased and improved FP/MCH services in the public sector.*									
A. Couple Years of Protection (CYP) provided by the public sector <sup>1</sup> ·Nationwide ·Selected Districts Data source: c, e	1990 TBD	23,959	38,512	41,752	<43,287> <sup>2</sup> (100,000)	(53,000)	(66,000)	(83,000)	(95,000)
B. % of population living within 5 km of a public sector FP/MCH service delivery point (fixed or mobile unit) providing a core set of services <sup>3</sup> ·Nationwide ·Selected Districts Data source: c, f	1992 TBD	32% †	32% †	32% †	‡ †	‡ †	√ √	(40%) √	‡ √
C. % of children presenting with malaria, acute respiratory infections, malnutrition and diarrheal disease treated according to established protocols in selected districts Data source: g	TBD		†	27% <sup>4</sup>	<80%> <sup>4</sup>	‡	√	(80%)	√
D. Proportion of delivery sites with basic minimum of resources (trained staff, equipment, and supplies, including pharmaceuticals) Data source: c	TBD <sup>5</sup>		†	†	†	†	√	√	√
E. % of pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid ·Nationwide ·Selected Districts Data source: a, d	1992 TBD	21%	35%	32%	30% <sup>6</sup>	(35%)	(40%)	(45%)	

### NOTES:

\* Although none of the indicators provided at this time focus on quality of services, the Mission anticipates that once activities have commenced, surveys will be conducted to determine whether clients were satisfied with the services received.

<sup>1</sup> CYP given here have been recalculated according to the USAID values. Estimate based on commodities distributed or sold to the user through MOPH facilities. Previous versions of the Plan had, unbeknownst to the Mission, used UNFPA calculations which were about 25% higher.

<sup>2</sup> Factors which account for non-achievement of this target include attacks by Muslim groups, strikes, and supply problems. In future years, targets have been adjusted downward.

<sup>3</sup> The core set of services includes family planning, prenatal care, immunization and selected care management. No statistics are provided for 1994-1998 because target districts have not yet been selected. Measurable progress is not expected until 1998 because the Mission does not expect to have a contractor chosen before October 1996, and activities are not expected to start until 1997.

<sup>4</sup> Figures for treatment according to standard protocols comes from a pilot study in two districts, Say and Boboye. While the survey is small, the techniques will be applied as soon as the activities under the new Strategic Objective Agreement begin.

<sup>5</sup> Baseline data remains to be determined because target districts have not been selected yet.

<sup>6</sup> 1995 data reflects a decrease from previous years due to strikes in 1994-1995.

**DISCUSSION:** These data present a snapshot of the effectiveness of public sector provision of family planning and health services over the past several years. Family planning services are primarily available to a population within five kilometers of a health facility, as is indicated by the unchanging 32% of the overall population of Niger that is estimated to live within reach of service sites. In an effort to develop models that can be used to provide services, a pilot project was initiated during 1995 in two districts which demonstrated that family planning and contraceptive use can be increased by targeting clients for service. The Mission hopes to expand on this experience in the coming years. The CYP trends over the past two years demonstrates that methods are available and used at all levels of the health care system. Much remains to be done. The data from the 1994 baseline survey on treatment of children according to standard protocols presented above demonstrates the poor quality of clinical services, but it also demonstrates how these services can be improved by relatively simple interventions.

While CYP cannot be directly translated into Contraceptive Prevalence Rates, historically changes in CYP have been shown to have a very high correlation to changes in CPR. A major feature of demographic transition is a shift in use of contraceptives from short-term methods (condoms, foaming tablets, pills) to long-term ones: e.g., IUDs, Norplant, and surgical contraception. As such, tracking the availability and use of centers providing these methods, and, more importantly, training a new generation of providers to support these methods is an important part in every nation's efforts to control population growth rates. While we suspect that demand for these methods is currently low, training a generation of health care providers will be crucial to being able to meet the demand that develops perhaps five years from now.

The national protocols that have been developed by the BASICS project are part of the earliest phases of a worldwide initiative in conjunction with WHO on the 'Integrated Case Management of the Sick Child'. This will combine management of diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, and malaria into a simple approach to managing the sick. The pilot program in Niger is among the most advanced in the world.

Many donors are active in this field. Certainly the Belgians have provided assistance in the development of a treatment strategy based on Chief Complaint, but this does not use physical examinations of the sick person to supplement the clinical interview. Few other donors are actively involved in long term and permanent methods of contraception.

It is often difficult to link long-term training directly with the achievement of results. The main reason for this is that people sent for such training, taking two to four or more years, will not return in time to make a significant difference in the achievement of Mission objectives. PTMS records for the past decade show that about 250 people have been trained in health, of whom 43 in the public sector and seven in the private sector are currently active in managing or promoting activities leading to achievement of USAID strategic objectives. Among the most important of these is the current Secretary General of the Ministry of Health, who has been a close collaborator and staunch supporter of the USAID effort. The key individuals in many of our programs were trained with USAID/Niger funds under previous projects. This demonstrates the importance of long-term training to achieving long-term health and population goals.

As new activities come on line, the Mission expects to see each of these indicators improve, although the degree and speed of improvement are more difficult to project.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1, RESULT 2

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 1.2: An expanded and improved private sector, including NGOs, providing FP and MCH promotion and services.									
A. # of private facilities providing FP and/or MCH services <sup>1</sup> Data source: f	1995	43 of 65	†	†	43 of 65 <sup>2</sup>	‡	√	√	√
B. % of population within 5 km of a private facility offering FP services <sup>1</sup> Data source: c	1995	6%	†	†	6% <sup>3</sup>	‡	√	√	√
C. Couple Years of Protection (CYP) <sup>4</sup> based on estimates of commodities distributed or sold to the user through social marketing and private sector NGOs <sup>5</sup> Data source: h	1994	4,400	†	4,400	7,508 (9,200) <sup>6</sup>	(10,400)	(12,000)	(16,000)	(20,000)
D. Area covered by social marketing efforts <sup>7</sup> Data source: h	1993	0	0	6 Dep'ts +Niamey	7 Dep'ts + Niamey (=National)	(National)	(National)	(National)	
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Performance measures A and B do not have out-year targets because USAID/Niger has not yet been able to realistically calculate the percentage of the population that could potentially be reached by private sector activities in a country with such a sparse, rural population as Niger's. <sup>2</sup> These data are given as a ratio because USAID's goal is to increase <i>both</i> the number of private health facilities <i>as well as</i> the total number of facilities. The 65 current facilities include 16 physicians offices, 10 clinics (including some inpatient beds), and 39 Nurse health care facilities ( <i>Salles de Soin</i> ). Of these, 27 nurses were trained in reproductive health, including provision of family planning services, in a two-day seminar held in December, 1995. <sup>3</sup> All reporting health centers providing MCH/FP services are located in Urban Niamey. The entire population of the urban center is considered to have physical access. <sup>4</sup> CYP calculation: 1 CYP=15 cycles hormonal pills, 1/3.5 IUD (average use 3 years), 150 foaming tablets, 150 condoms. <sup>5</sup> Currently, only the social marketing program distributes condoms. NGOs will be added in future years. SOMARC activities included 7 radio/TV spots, 15 newspaper articles, 24 <i>Thé débats/soirées</i> , and three seminars/training sessions. <sup>6</sup> Targets reported in Niger's 1995 API were based on the UNFPA method; these targets are adjusted to reflect the USAID definition of CYP. <sup>7</sup> The Mission currently collects information based on departments, however, once a new contract is in place, we believe that more specific areas can, and will, be targeted for monitoring.									

**DISCUSSION:** With the exception of the social marketing program, very little progress has been made to date in support to the private sector. In the first quarter of 1995 the residual effects of the attacks on family planning by Islamic fundamentalists were still being felt, but these were overcome by the end of the year. This accounts for not reaching our target. The social marketing program has shown marked increases in distribution of condoms over the two years of operation. It is now time to expand the product line, and increase the intensity of effort. Support

to private practitioners began this year, with training in reproductive health provided to nurses in a seminar that took place late in 1995.

Activities leading to these results will be linked to changes in the legal and bureaucratic environment, which currently tends to stifle all private sector activity, and to the activities intended to improve access to credit. Over the next several years, USAID expects to see the private sector become a very important player in the provision of family planning and maternal and child health commodities, information and services.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1, RESULT 3

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 1.3: Improved environment for health services, including policy reform.									
A. A policy environment which advocates fewer restrictions on access to modern family planning methods (e.g., regulations regarding tubal ligations) and which favors practical health policy and financial reforms supportive of the role of private health service providers Data source: h					Note 1				
B. A functioning National Health Information System providing decision-makers with relevant data <sup>2</sup> Data source: h					See discussion				
C. # of hospital facilities recovering costs Data source: h	1993	0	0	3 of 8	3 of 8 (3)	√	√	(8) √	√
D. # of non-hospital MOPH facilities (total 545) with user fee collection system Data source: f	1992	0	18	51	68 <sup>3</sup> (95)	(160)	(240)	(330)	(420)
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> 1995 activities included extensive dialogue with Islamic parties, resulting in the participation of most in family planning campaigns, the regional conference on Islam and Women (sponsored by IPPF with support from other donors including USAID), and work on finalizing the Medium Term Plan for implementation of Cairo Conference recommendations. A major accomplishment in 1995 was passage of a law authorizing health sector cost recovery, providing for community choice of direct or indirect recovery methods. <sup>2</sup> Effective use of National Health Information System (SNIS) Activity reports and Studies will indicate that the system is functional, as was reflected in use of SNIS data to identify and respond to Niger's 1995 meningitis epidemic. Between 15-20 reports were published by SNIS in 1995. <sup>3</sup> The 1995 calculation includes 18 sites supported by USAID in Boboye and Say, 44 in Maradi supported by UNICEF, 6 at Gaya supported by the Belgians, and 26 in Tera and Filingué supported by the Dutch. Actuals did not meet the expected target due to procurement delays in USAID/W which prevented the Mission from getting the program on the ground on schedule, administrative difficulties, and because targets were based on the activities of other donors.									

**DISCUSSION:** The upward trend in CYP between 1993 and 1995 is encouraging. However, significant policy and program constraints exist: (1) stronger commitment by health personnel at all levels is needed; (2) a proven IE&C strategy needs to be implemented at all levels; (3) greater commitment to adequate quality of care, supervision, follow-up and counselling is needed; and (4) continued efforts are needed to convince Nigeriennes and Nigériens of the appropriateness and benefits of family planning.

SO1 activities in 1995 resulted in the improvement of the management of the SNIS data base at the central level, and planned for improvements at the department and district level. This technical assistance resulted in the Monthly Disease Status Report that proved useful in managing the meningitis and measles epidemics, as well as in assessing periodic outbreaks of cholera.

Activities centered on the three national hospitals improved the effectiveness of the cost recovery program, including development of a

revised fee schedule, development and installation of a general accounting system, and a national workshop to facilitate planning. These activities also resulted in greater coordination between facilities.

The availability of counterpart funds teamed with technical assistance resulted in the development of activity budgets and workplans, revised training materials, the national training schedule, and the availability of essential medicines used to stock existing and new cost recovery sites.

A major policy shift that has occurred following the *coup d'etat* has been the consolidation of the Ministry of Social Development, Population, and Women's Issues into the Ministry of Health (Social Development and Women's Issues) and the Ministry of Finance and Plan (Population). This is an outcome that has been sought for several years, because MSDPWI has always been viewed as being ineffectual. We feel this is a positive move that will bear fruit in the long run.

Many of the activities are closely linked to activities in democracy and governance, in that the effort is being made to improve management at the central and district levels, to encourage continued decentralization, including flow of resources from the center to the district level, and to increase community input and control of local health service delivery.

This set of results were achieved with close donor communication. All policy dialogue in family planning is done in close communication with UNFPA and IPPF. In addition, the cooperation among four donors has been mentioned in the development of cost recovery sites. Pharmaceutical procurement and management reform has been accomplished by carefully balancing inputs from USAID, the EEC, and the FAC to ensure that all gain from the inputs made by each donor and the Government of Niger.

Through the non-project assistance portion of the NHSS grant, many necessary policy reforms have been leveraged. Some of these have to do with financing and cost recovery at various levels of the health care system, with legalization of family planning commodities. Even in the absence of NPA, USAID plays an important role in the policy dialogue.

Given the *coup d'etat* of January 27, 1996, it is unclear what directions the policy dialogue will take. The Mission anticipates continued inputs and continued improvements on a personal and project basis, but anticipates no budget support activities until after a return to democracy.



## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1, RESULT 4

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 1.4: National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters.									
A. % of estimated food aid requirement met by emergency distributions and mitigation activities within vulnerable areas Data source: d	1995	10%	†	0+	10%	(15%)	(20%)	(20%)	(20%)
B. A verifiable and reliable legally constituted nationwide SAP/GC system in place Data source: d	1995	40%	†	0	40% completed	(60%) completed	target completion date	√	√
C. # of times and to what degree the SAP/Emergency Fund or SAP/GC mechanism is used by other donors Data source: d	1995	2	†	†	2	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)
D. # of disaster type events followed up by emergency response Data source: a, c, d	1995	13	†	†	13	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)
E. # of mitigation activities coordinated by SAP/GC ·Monitoring entities ·Discrete activities Data source: d	1994	2 †	† †	2 †	50 338	(100) (500)	(120) (600)	(120) (600)	(120) (600)
F. % of pest-threatened hectares protected to control agricultural pests Data source: k, m	1993	36%	36%	56%	43%	(50%)	(50%)	(50%)	(50%)
G. % of total crops lost to pests Data source: k, m	1992	16%	30%	24%	20%	(18%)	(16%)	(12%)	(10%)
NOTES: A thorough review by the food security results package team concluded that the four measures previously listed did not effectively capture progress towards meeting this complex and multifaceted result. There are arguably four major components to this food security and disaster mitigation result: institution and capacity building in both early warning and response; the development of cost effective measures to target resources (food and other) for food insecure and other threatened populations; and the ability to cost effectively protect crops which adds significantly top the national food stock and reduces malnutrition.									

**DISCUSSION:** The measures used to indicate progress toward the achievement of this result capture progress on three fronts. The first is to establish a well trained, transparent, credible and sustainable national body (the SAP/GC) with nationwide capacity to be forewarned, prepared and capable of responding to disaster affecting the fundamental well being of the population. Nutritional disasters stem in part from poor harvests and inadequate coping mechanisms. The second front is the protection of the standing crops, the food supply, from pest attack. The third front is the

maintenance of nutrition and health by the simple transfer of food commodities, or the means to purchase them, to targeted vulnerable populations through mitigation activities. Mitigation replaces large scale free food aid distribution to populations of geographical areas indicated to be at risk, which is an extremely cost ineffective means to combat food insecurity and malnutrition.

We estimate that in 1995 approximately 28% of vulnerable populations were reached and benefited from SAP/GC emergency or mitigation interventions. Mitigation activities with 1,162 metric tons (MT) food for work initiatives were targeted to vulnerable populations in the Departments of Diffa, Dosso, Maradi, Tahoua, Tillaberi and Zinder. Emergency food distributions to vulnerable populations were on the order of 240 tons of food. Rice seed distribution to those who lost seed due to flooding resulted in approximately 4,600 MT of rice harvested in 1995. Overall, the approximately 6,000 MT of food distributed and produced through the DPM support of the SAP/GC accounted for approximately 10% of total food aid requirements estimated for 1995.

A verifiable and reliable SAP/GC early warning system is in place. The SAP/GC at present uses the sub-regional committees as an integral part of its early warning system. The committees members who represent various Government of Niger Ministries at the local level are charged with forwarding to the SAP/GC in Niamey relevant early warning information at the end of the growing season. Much refinement of the system has taken place within the last two years. The reliability of the SAP/GC vulnerability scale is recognized by FEWS/USAID and many of the donors as being reliable and accurate as any early warning indicator available.

Reliability of the present SAP/GC early warning capacity is being improved through training the sub-regional committee members and by further refining the present SAP Questionnaire—particularly the socioeconomic indicators of early warning and vulnerability assessment. The DPM continues assisting the SAP/GC committees in following up on its evaluations on a regular basis. This would allow SAP to monitor the situation as it evolves throughout the post harvest season up to the period of *soudure*—the traditional hardship period just prior the start of the new growing season—thus leading to improved targeting of mitigation interventions.

The National Disaster Plan will provide the institutional framework and operational plan necessary for effective management of localized or national disasters, specifying the roles of local administrative and elected authorities in the use of available resources for emergency or mitigation interventions. A draft institutional framework and background legal texts have been developed and circulated among CN/SAP/GC partners to vet and refine these drafts. Additional studies will be undertaken within the next months to define disaster intervention thresholds and to further refine the methodology by which the level of vulnerability to famine is identified. After the development and submission to the National Assembly of a draft

National Disaster Plan, the passage into law of supporting texts is required to formally establish the Plan.

Pending the enactment of the national disaster plan into law, DPM has provided extensive training and obtained ministerial permission to task the Ministry of Finance and Planning technical agents at the arrondissement-level to manage mitigation funds and to account for expenditures and maintain procurement integrity. Procedures are being developed for regional SAP/GC committees to manage and be responsible for portions of the Emergency Fund for localized mitigation and relief use.

The sustainability of the DPM supported SAP/GC system depends on other donor support and utilization. There is clear evidence that other donors will support the SAP/GC. The EU is in the final stages of funding technical assistance to the SAP/GC to enhance its capacity to conduct rapid assessments of communities reported to be at risk. The Government of France has pledged to provide 3,000 MT of locally purchased of cereals for the SAP/GC to program as food for work. The UN/FAO has pledged a contribution of \$218,000 to the SAP/GC emergency fund for SAP/GC developed food for work. UNICEF has contributed \$30,000 for the training of SAP/GC regional *cellules* to improve their capacity to develop and write up mitigation activities.

A key test of the system is its ability to respond effectively to disaster. In 1995 the SAP/GC responded to the 11 local disasters reported by the regional *cellules*. Seven of these were fires and required the provision of temporary shelter, emergency food and housing. The SAP/GC also prepositioned antibiotics for an expected cholera epidemic. Over 112 MT of emergency food was purchased and distributed in the North to aid the reintegration of former combatants, and an additional 45 MT of food was transported. The SAP/GC system responded extremely well to these events. The SAP/GC undertook 338 separate mitigation activities in as many locations in 1995. These resulted in considerable improvements to the natural resource base reported in detail in SO3 results.

The crop protection operations are conducted through agricultural spraying aircraft (60%), special trucks on the ground (25%), and by village brigades (15%). Department of Crop Protection technicians estimate that the effective treatment of 10 ha corresponds to an effective protection of 15 to 30 ha. In 1995 the DCP treated 385,500 ha of infested land or 43% of the total. The actual estimated percent of crop losses due to pests attacking millet crops before harvest is 20%, and 2-5% for post-harvest losses. We

estimate that currently this is equivalent to 340,000 MT, or the cereal requirement of 1,800,000

Nigeriens. The target of decreasing the losses by 2-4% each year will correspond to securing additional food for 180,000 Nigeriens. Thus reducing crop loss to pests by only a few percent dramatically increases food availability with both nutritional and economic consequences.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO1, RESULT 5

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 1.5: A public that is better informed of key public health policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities.									
A. # of local councils trained in local governance and local policy issues (in target areas of SO1) Data source: n	TBD					(5%)	(40%)	(80%)	(100%)
B. % of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one health policy issue Data source: f, j	TBD								
C. % of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify statements of their rights Data source: f, j	TBD								
D. # of village health committees that have received specialized training in democracy and governance Data source: n	TBD								
NOTES: *The Strategic Objective Agreement was signed September 26, 1995. Activities leading to these results have not yet begun due to delays in Mission contractor placement.									

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO2

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Strategic Objective 2: Increased access to markets through use of improved decentralized financial services.									
A. Total # of institutions providing small loans · C r e d i t u n i o n s ( a )  ·Cooperatives (b) ·Women's groups (b) ·Maradi Microenterprise Bank (c) ·Semi-formal savers/lenders (TBD)	1985 1989 1989 1992 1985 1995	0 0 0 0 0 0	98 20 28 38 12 0	148 37 49 48 14 0	153 (181) 67 <sup>1</sup> (60) 42 (54) 30 <sup>2</sup> (53) 14 (14) 0 (0)	(244) (80) (80) (70) (14) (0)	(294) (100) (90) (90) (14) (0)	(474) (120) (160) (180) (14) (0)	(554) (140) (200) (200) (14) (0)
B. # of credit institutions and money lenders/handlers not dependent on donors Data source: a, b, c	1989	0	‡	<20>	<25> (35)	(30)	(35)	(50)	(75)
C. Volume of agro-pastoral exports in metric tons (three year moving average) <sup>3</sup> ·Onions ·Skins and hides ·Cowpeas ·Livestock Data source: d, e, f	1995 TBD 1995 TBD	32,534  87,049							
D. Household expenditures for production Data source: g	1996	TBD							
E. % of customers satisfied with USAID and partner's efforts Data source: h	1996	TBD							

**NOTES:**

<sup>1</sup> The Credit union number is as of January 31, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> Beyond the 30 women's groups who got loans this year, 33 others received training from APOR (NGO created within CLUSA program which now is independent and operates under grants or contracts with various donors) in various management program and financial skills.

<sup>3</sup> This data is to be presented on the basis of a three year moving average. The baseline data shown represents only the first year of the 1995-1996-1997 three-year moving average. 1997 could have been provided as the baseline, for that is the first year in which we will be able to provide reliable data for three consecutive years. Crop production data from prior years is not reliable. A source of livestock data is being sought.

**DATA SOURCE KEY (Source/ Method of data collection/ Frequency of collection):**

a = WOCCU (World Council of Credit Unions)

b = CLUSA (Cooperative League of the USA)

c = CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere)

d = Customs Department, *Direction de la Statistique*, Records review, Annual

e = Niger-Nigeria trade study, USAID Policy Analysis and Monitoring Project, 1995 and update, (underway)

f = Directorate of Crop Protection Service, Records review, Annual

g = National Household NRM Survey

h = Customer survey

i = Drivers Association and Vehicle Owners Association, Sample survey, Annual

j = Geographic Information System (GIS) for all SOs and cross-cutting themes

k = "Findings on Illicit Enrichment", Callen, G., 1995

m = USAID/Niger Office of Education and Training, Records review, Semi-annual, Project reports

n = Bank records, Activity reports, Semi-annual

p = Government of Niger

q = "NEPRP In-Country Surveys", Callen, G., 1995

e = "Rural Financial Institutions, Economic Policy Reform Programs, and Agribusiness in Sub-Saharan Africa." Gemini T.R.N' 95, 1995 (including draft annex on Case Studies in Niger)

**TARGET KEY:**

‡ = no data collected in this year

**SUMMARY:** In FY 1995 USAID/Niger made slow but steady progress towards increased access to markets through use of improved decentralized financial services. The number of decentralized financial institutions (DFIs) increased despite budgetary reductions imposed on two programs, showing the solid demand for these services. Estimates of already viable DFIs also increased, though not as rapidly as anticipated. Other measures (export volume, household surveys and customer surveys) for the part of this SO which deals with access to markets are still being developed as program assessment and design continues. Data is now available for the first year of the three-year moving average for onions and cowpeas.

**ANALYSIS:** Reductions in guarantee fund availability, due to problems with the almost failed BIAO/Meridian (now BIAO Niger), and the efforts required to bring two new banks into the picture caused a major delay in getting loan funds out to cooperatives. However, training and promotion efforts for cooperatives and women's groups on becoming owners of their own rural bank continued with 278 rural organizations, bringing the total DFIs with which we are working to over 350. Without funding availability, neither input nor output markets can exist. USAID and REDSO/WCA are in process of developing a more scientific measure of viability of DFIs.

In spite of not reaching the all of the targets for number of institutions providing small loans (Measure 2A), we are showing increases which, under the difficult circumstances of Niger (devaluation, late salary payments, etc.), such progress is extraordinary. Lack of financing availability is both a bank problem and a USAID budget problem which would have been solved shortly through (1) an increase in the guarantee fund with ASDGII counterpart funds, and (2) an increase in bankers' confidence that they are making and will continue to make money by loaning to rural producers. We may still be able to address this issue if democracy gets back on track and we are able to resume the provision of assistance in this sector. There are commercial banking problems in Niger and we are in process of helping the banks work towards overcoming some of these challenges -- most notably excess liquidity.

The enabling conditions which have lead to the long-term positive changes towards increased access to markets include (1) the elimination of the mandatory Central Cooperative Union -- which may revive itself, but with decentralized control, and (2) the fact that the GON, and the Ministry of Finance and Plan specifically, have been moving towards a structurally adjusted economy due to pressure from USAID and the IMF/WB to reduce the role of the State and improve the environment for the private sector. The advent of democracy also reduced corruption -- which had stifled a healthy entrepreneurial spirit and replaced it with a perverse one which

encouraged collusion and bribery. Now, entrepreneurs are able to succeed based more on solid ideas and hard work and less on relationships and payoffs. There is still a long way to go in terms of reform of tax policy, labor policy, public expenses, etc., but the current environment is far superior to the situation which existed five to ten years ago.

There is wide variance between data on livestock exports as provided by the Livestock Department and the Customs Department. Because of U.S. legal constraints, USAID is unable to provide assistance in data processing and analysis to the Customs Department. One consultant (Zalla, July 1993) recommends onion production as the best indicator of export activity, while another report (Callen, December 1995) indicates that onion exports are on the rise while export of other commodities is not. Recent reports from the FEWS and DPM project staff indicate that exports of cowpeas may also be continuing to rise given a record harvest this year. The trade data from the Niger-Nigerian studies, planned for completion in June, coupled with a brief visit to review customs ledgers at the Torodi crossing into Burkina Faso, will provide reportable data until customs or the crop protection agency data becomes available.

**USAID CONTRIBUTION:** USAID is responsible for the results described above. Though there are 15 other DFI programs operating in Niger servicing an estimated 200 DFIs, the USAID programs are the only microenterprise or rural production programs to have the potential to become self-sustaining. Efforts in export marketing are also mainly a USAID initiative, although we are encouraging other donors to get involved in assisting Customs to develop a better information system. The UNDP has asked the Mission to lead the effort of other donors in microenterprise investments. Our programs are being expanded by other donors: the WB in the case of WOCCU; the IFAD in the case of CLUSA; the French in the case of APOR ; and the UNDP/UNEF for BRK.

**LINKAGES:** Credit availability is intrinsically linked to any activity which requires small scale private investment, providing the only new means of obtaining credit in Niger. We are also working to reduce constraints to private initiatives including health care and NRM activities like crop production or growing trees as a cash crop. Although the PAM capacity building program contributes primarily to SO2, the results of the Agro-pastoral and Feasibility of Privatizing the Veterinary studies underway are expected to have an impact on both SO1 and SO3 by providing information in the areas of natural resources and nutrition.

**EXPECTED PROGRESS:** Given limited funding resources, we cannot have the impact targeted for economic reform in our Strategic Plan. The goal of 10% per year average increase in exports is not achievable with reduced funding so targets have been adjusted to reflect a 5% increase in exports.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SO2, RESULT 1

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)		1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE								
Result 2.1: More decentralized, viable and transparent financial services.										
A. Total # of customers/members of decentralized financial institutions in target areas <sup>1</sup> ·Men ·Women ·Corporate Data source: a, b, c	1987	0	17,644	20,548	24,285	(23,500)	(28,130)	(32,140)	(40,150)	(50,160)
			12,588	14,045	16,877	(16,500)	(19,000)	(21,000)	(26,000)	(32,000)
			5,070	6,444	7,283	(7,000)	(9,000)	(11,000)	(14,000)	(18,000)
			26	59	125	(N/A)	(130)	(140)	(150)	(160)
B. Amount lent and saved (billion current FCFA) ·Men ·Women Data source: a, b, c	1987	0	0.985	0.976	1.276	(1.2)	(1.250)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.6)
			0.790	0.636	0.870	(0.888)	(0.900)	(0.925)	(0.950)	(1.000)
			0.195	0.340	0.406	(0.312)	(0.350)	(0.375)	(0.450)	(0.600)
C. % of loans repaid <sup>2</sup> ·Credit Unions ·Coops/Women's Groups ·Maradi Microenterprise Bank Data source: a, b, c	1993 1993 1994	100% 98.9% (40%)	100% 98.9% unknown	100% 87.9% <40%>	(90%) <sup>3</sup> 99.9% 92.6% <75%>		(92%) <sup>3</sup>	(95%) <sup>3</sup>	(90%) <sup>3</sup>	(95%) <sup>3</sup>
D. % of total number of loans which are for \$300 (150,000 current FCFA) or less ·Men ·Women Data source: a, b, c	1996	TBD								
							(75%) (85%)	(80% ) (80%)	(80%) (75%)	(80%) (70%)

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> The numbers of members/customers was calculated in prior years using a cumulative total for each USAID supported DFI. This measure gives a distorted view of numbers of customers for the organizations, which do not necessarily have a membership system similar to credit unions where each member is active in savings programs. For other DFIs the best measure of active customers is number of people who have had one or more loan actions each year. Because the DFIs don't deal with each customer every year, counting the loan actions cumulatively does not provide as good a measure of progress toward increasing access to DFIs as counting only those customers with whom we have dealt with each year. The figures for '93, '94, and '95 actuals, as well as future targets, have been revised counting all credit union members plus number of people who received loans one or more times during 1995. In 1995, the cumulative, unadjusted number of customers/members of DFIs (47,524 total, 31,982 men, 15,417 women, 125 corporate) surpassed our targets (40,000 total, 25,000 men, 15,000 women).

<sup>2</sup> Percent reimbursement rate is now defined as over one year late. This is a more accurate measure of repayment rate than counting a loan that is one day late as overdue. The baseline has been changed to this year's rate. Measures have been standardized for all of our DFIs.

<sup>3</sup> Targets for reimbursement rates are given for the year, actual and estimated rates are given for each USAID funded program.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 2.1: More decentralized, viable and transparent financial services.									
E. Cumulative # of DFIs having received basic democracy and governance training (linked to D/G) <sup>4</sup> Data source: a, b, c, i	1995	345			345	(365)	(385)	(490)	(560)
F. % of drought vulnerable areas with mitigation activities which also have DFI support (linked to Food Security) Data source: j	1996	TBD					(20%)		(50%)
G. % of health associations with or near financial services (linked to SO1) Data source: j	1996	TBD					(15%)		(30%)
H. % of NRM associations with or near financial services (linked to SO3) Data source: j	1996	TBD					(20%)		(35%)
NOTES: <sup>4</sup> This democracy/governance indicator is to demonstrate the D/G work which goes on in any sound grassroots DFI program. Training in elections and rights and responsibilities is essential to the entire program to assure transparency. This result has therefore been changed to reflect the idea of basic training.									

**DISCUSSION:** The number of individuals served by DFIs continued to grow, surpassing targets for this year. This is true for the cumulative number of customers/members and the new, adjusted indicator of individuals served in a year. This is in spite of the necessary retrenching and reorganization of the BRK, and the problems noted above. The reimbursement rates are excellent with the exception of BRK, which is improving markedly and meeting recommendations of a critical audit report. Women's participation is significant. We are steadily moving toward institutional sustainability, one of the most important of USAID's long-term goals. Recently the manager of Togo's Credit Union Movement noted that the movement in Niger had achieved in just a few years, what had taken 15 years to achieve in Togo.

The number of customers continues to increase, despite readjustments in two of three projects. Even more significant, the rural and urban poor are finding the means to save, borrow and especially to *reimburse* loans, as well as manage their own institutions. High repayment rates have made the CLUSA coop program the only program among many which received guarantee funds during the '80s, and which is still using those same funds.

Guarantee funds of the other organizations have been lost to poor reimbursement records.

Except for the new measure which demonstrates the continuous D/G work underway, the linkage measures have not advanced to the point of measurable results. A GIS database is being developed to map USAID/Niger's activities and show where there is linkage potential, e.g., where mitigation activities are in areas where credit unions exist. The database will identify these overlaps and increase linkages between SOs. Whether just holding mitigation activity funds in a local institution, or providing special long term drought savings and/or emergency credit/guarantee programs, synergy will be significant.

USAID is, if not completely responsible, at least the leader in this field. Other donors are sponsoring DFI programs, but not, in general, leading to either viable nor transparent institutions. These are mainly resource transfers and often do not even attempt to develop institutions. These programs can also have a marginal negative impact on our programs by



competing at a village level with non-sustainable interest rates. USAID is promoting collaboration among donors to resolve these problems.

As with all SO2 activities, linkages of Result 1 with other Mission SOs and cross-cutting themes are being developed. DFIs can serve as natural

catalysts to other efforts. Organizing IE&C activities in other domains around the DFIs, will both promote DFI members taking part in other activities and bring new members to the DFIs by having the training at their locality. Literacy courses will use instructional materials from all of the SOs and cross-cutting themes.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SO 2, RESULT 2

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 2.2: Improved environment for microenterprises: Better polices, better laws and better information.									
A. Illicit payments of FCFA per kilometer (in millions of May,1992 FCFA) Data source: k and prior surveys	1992	54		26	20 <sup>1</sup> (24)	(20)	(18)	(16)	(14)
B. % of transporters trained in export and transportation regulations Data source: i	1995	0%			0% (0%)	(10%)	(20%)	(35%)	(50%)
C. Expansion of or additional MIS (marketing information services) in place Data source: n							target completion date		
D. % of interested customers who listen to the expanded MIS or new MIS and find it helpful Data source: h	1997 <sup>2</sup>	TBD					(0%)		(25%)
E. Cumulative # of Ph.D. candidates in Economics Data source: m	1995	0			0 (0)	(2)	(5)		
F. Passage of relevant legislation ·Credit Union legislation ·Cooperatives legislation ·Improved pesticide legislation Data source: p						(X)	(X) (X)		

**NOTES:**

<sup>1</sup> The figure for 1995 excludes one road section, Niamey–Zinder. The values for this section were much higher than in prior years and much higher than in the opposite direction. It was one of only two of 14 sections with an increase. Checking the calculations for 1992 and 1994 without this route, changes in cost/km were insignificant. Therefore the cost/km for 1995 without Niamey–Zinder is used, assuming it was an anomaly, and are investigating why this might have occurred.

<sup>2</sup> Baseline for Measure D was changed from 1996, as indicated in the CPSP/Performance Monitoring Plan, to 1997, the year in which the first survey will be conducted.

**DISCUSSION:** Illicit road taxes and other impediments to improved marketing of agro-pastoral exports continue to fall; the third consecutive fall confirms our success story. These results suggest that anti-corruption reforms are more easily enforceable under democracy. The cost of transporting onions to Abidjan has fallen due to reduced illicit road taxes. The interruption of democracy in Niger may significantly affect illegal payments; echoes from the field have raised concern that the payments may already be increasing.

The measures which deal with MIS are not targeted until 1997, and possibly later depending on availability of funds.

Though there are no PHD candidates yet, the PAM program has developed a unique third-country course in Morocco which may have even more impact than the PhD training. The training planned in Morocco for 12 Nigerien economists is a custom-made course with the best professors and private economists in Morocco providing real life economic modeling and policy development training for the people who will make a difference in the Niger of today and tomorrow.

As a member of the West African Monetary Union, new credit union legislation is expected to be enacted in Niger. New legislation for cooperatives is more problematic as this is a movement which has had a negative history of government involvement. Nonetheless, within the democratic context and with the aid of CLUSA and others, the cooperatives are finding a new vigor and purpose. They are working to open their own banking institution, co-owned with the commercial banks, but dedicated to decentralized rural production-oriented lending.

Other legislation efforts will require more funding than USAID/Niger has been able to provide. Nonetheless, a new measure of legislative action has been added to encourage passage of legislation affecting the import and use of pesticides. This may have economic ramification on both production and export of agro-pastoral products. The Results Package Team for USAID/Niger's Office of Food Security will be responsible for the policy dialogue in this effort.

The PAM project is improving the capacity of the Government of Niger to make better-informed economic policy choices and to monitor and quantify the impact of the policies selected, the program employs two principle components: 1) a series of economic research studies, including development of sources of economic data by Nigeriens, 2) training of several government employees in the United States at the master's degree level, and 3) training for larger numbers of employees through local workshops and seminars in Niger.

The *Tableau des Opérations Financières de l'Etat* (TOFE), i.e the State's Balance Sheet, prepared by the PAM is a very productive document for the Ministry of Finance & Plan (MFP). During the last six months the MFP has gone from using three-month old data to having the TOFE up to date within one month. This was one of the points of that impressed the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Funds (IMF) during the latest negotiations.

The report of the *Bases des Données Macro-economique et Financières au Niger*, done by the current Minister of Finance & Plan as a PAM researcher before he became Minister, is now used as a guide for all Nigerien economists working at the MFP. The Minister of Finance is using a model developed by PAM regarding a new income tax schedule. It was adopted by the National Assembly and is being implemented

In improving the environment for microenterprises in Niger, USAID is the leader, but not the most important players in terms of funding availability. The IMF/WB are the big investors in this domain and their efforts will have an impact on achieving our targets. The European Union, the French and the Germans are also important participants in this effort. However, even with the limited resources being made available to SO2, USAID has influence on the environment for microenterprises. USAID is the recognized leader in this sector and will be able to influence what the WB/IMF and other donors do in this area well beyond the level of our resources. As recognized leaders in the field, some policy reform can be attained through dialogue, even without NPA.

The microenterprise environment naturally affects all aspects of USAID/Niger's program whether it is a private clinic getting reduced taxes, or a peasant women knowing the price of the peanut oil she makes in

nearby markets of Nigeria, or a cooperative that manages a forest because the cooperative law provides them with rights to forests, or an onion farmer who can't get the required pesticide because the right legislation is not in place. We are using the D/G and training programs to enhance this environment.

Two of the anticipated reforms are being omitted due to the lack of funding. Targets have been changed to reflect the reality of lower funding levels and a suspension of assistance, assuming democracy will be reinstituted by late 1996, and that USAID returns to full force in 1997 or 1998.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SO 2, RESULT 3

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 2.3: Bankers work more with microenterprises and informal sector.									
A. # of banks with decentralized financial services <sup>1</sup> Data source: n	1993	(1)	1	1	2 (1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)
B. % of volume of loans guaranteed Data source: n	1993	100%	100%	90%	90% (85%)	(85%)	(80%)	(70%)	(60%)
C. Multiple of guarantee fund which banks will provide in credit (leveraging ratio) <sup>2</sup> Data source: n	1993	1	1	1	1 (0)	(1.2)	(1.5)	(2.0)	(2.0)
D. # of bank staff trained in local languages Data source: n	1990	1	1	0	0 (0)	(1)	(2)	(5)	(10)
<b>NOTES:</b> <sup>1</sup> Measure A will be replaced by a more meaningful measure of amounts invested by commercial banks in the rural sector each year. <sup>2</sup> The leveraging ratio is sometimes hard for even bankers to understand. It is not simply the inverse of the guarantee rate, though the inverse will bring about the same increase in available loan funds. A leveraging rate of 2 can exist at the same time as a guarantee rate of 90%. This provides the bankers with reduced risk while providing at the same time many more loan funds. The problem is that guarantee funds naturally are depleted much more rapidly if guarantee and leveraging are both high.									

**DISCUSSION:** The fact that CLUSA is now working with two commercial banks indicative of the increased interest in the rural sector by commercial banks. The guarantee rate of 90% for these new agreements is reasonable and being renegotiated for 1996, along with the possibility of a leveraging ratio. Training of bankers in the use of local languages is in this year's Action Plan.

The most important accomplishment under this result is the creation of the Results Package Team 2.3, which includes representatives from the three major commercial banks as well as the three USAID funded PVOs and GON officials from the Chamber of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture. The bankers visited Mali to see the progress made there in commercial banks, as well as in the Malian Agricultural Development Bank. The critical elements of success in Mali for the Nigerian Bankers were: 1) the community development of the villagers through village associations or

tons; 2) the literacy skills of villagers and bankers; and 3) the commercialization system for agricultural products, notably cotton, where payment for crops passes through formal banks thereby guaranteeing agricultural input loans. Some bankers may be concluding that they must invest in rural production or resign themselves to a zero growth policy within their bank. Since there is no longer an agricultural development bank in Niger, some bankers seem to be recognizing an opportunity here. SONIBANK has said they needed no funds to pursue his goal of rural credit, just the right personnel. The problem is an almost total lack of experience in rural credit. During the SO2 Action Planning retreat in August, the bankers suggested a more meaningful measure to replace Result 2.3A: Amounts which banks are investing in the rural sector. This measure will appear in next years' R2.

Though better terms of guarantee with bankers has not been a target, negotiations have begun. A local financial accountant will calculate profits with various levels of guarantee and reimbursement rates. This will demonstrate the advantage of making more loans through our programs with their high rates of return. USAID can take complete credit for the progress in achieving this result. This private sector initiative is becoming institutionalized. Though a small amount of training and TA funds may reinforce its growth, it does not need significant funding.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SO 2, RESULT 4

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 2.4: Increased number and size of women's enterprises.									
A. Of all loans given, % given to women Data source: a, b, c	1994	<28%> <sup>1</sup>		<28%>	<28%> (37%)	(29%)	(30%)	(35%)	(40%)
B. # of women and girls trained in: ·Literacy ·Numeracy ·Economic/civic rights ·Democracy Data source: a, b, c	1996	TBD							(60,000) (60,000) (30,000) (30,000)
C. # of men completing training which sensitizes them to women's economic role Data source: a, b, c	1995	0			0	(2,000)	(8,000)	(14,000)	(20,000)
D. % women among IE&C (Information, Education and Communication) marketing trainees Data source: a, b, c	1997	(25%)					(25%)	(30%)	(35%)

**NOTES:**

<sup>1</sup> Recalculation of baseline figures show that in 1994 only 28% of all loans were given to women, instead of the 34% noted in the CPSP/Performance Monitoring Plan. Subsequent targets have been adjusted accordingly.

**DISCUSSION:** The percentage of women receiving loans has not decreased, but the lack of increase attests to the fact that more needs to be done in achieving this Result. The lack of targets for other measures is also an indication of the great need to develop this results package. The required training programs are being developed, but most of RPTeam 2.4's time over the past year has been spent in providing members with the information and means necessary to develop a program which works. This has been done through field visits, document collection, questionnaires and case studies.

Integrating gender concerns into the development process has proved difficult throughout the history of this issue. One successful method of improving opportunities for women is to get women involved in the planning process, as we have done in creating a Results Package Team with a majority of women. Setting aside funds for women's initiatives has proved to be one of the most successful means of including women in development efforts. The *raison d'être* for this Results Package is to use these techniques to increase women's participation. As we are just beginning, the already-respectable results don't show great improvement. However, in spite of budget reductions, a significant improvement is expected in percentage of women's loans when we buy into a Grameen Bank-type operation through the Catholic Relief Service, which begins this year and which will propose funding under our SO Agreement in FY97 or FY98.

Many other donors are providing assistance to improve the lot of women in Niger, but needs are tremendous. Through the use of a team devoted to integrating women in the rest of SO2's portfolio, USAID is trying to focus these efforts as well as provide a networking forum for various activities, programs, organizations, agencies and donors. The key, to making a difference in this domain is keeping the issue at the forefront, making it impossible to disregard. We have adjusted our targets according to reduced levels of funding in FY96 and FY97, but keep them rising as these results depend on mentality as much as money.

## **PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SO 2, RESULT 5**

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 2.5: A public well informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities.									
A. % of local councils trained in local governance and local policy issues (in target areas of SO2) <sup>1</sup> Data source: j	1995	0%			0%	(5%)	(40%)	(80%)	(100%)
B. % of drivers trained in export and transportation regulations Data source: i	1995	0%			0%	(10%)	(20%)	(35%)	(50%)
C. Expansion of or additional MIS services in place Data source: n							target completion date		
D. % of interested customers who listen to the expanded MIS or new MIS and find it helpful Data source: h	1997	(0%)					(0%)		(25%)
E. # of men completing training which sensitizes them to women's economic role Data source: a, b, c	1995	0			0	(2,000)	(8,000)	(14,000)	(20,000)
F. # of DFIs which have received specialized Democracy/Governance training each year <sup>2</sup> Data source: a, b, c	1995	0			0	(25)	(100)	(150)	(200)
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Targets are based on the assumption that decentralization law implementation is begun, administrative and territorial organization laws are enacted, and elections are held in 1996. <sup>2</sup> More significant training in political rights and responsibilities is a new result which was not included in the strategic plan but will be important to strengthening the different DFIs.									

**DISCUSSION:** Planning training for truck drivers on their rights and responsibilities has just begun. Since the events of January 27, this training has become even more important. Other efforts are yet to begin. A new measure has been added to indicate the level of D/G training for DFIs on monitoring the politicization of rural populations, following on the existing training on understanding democratic principles. This will promote the political value of organization in our SO groups, cooperatives, and associations.

USAID is again a leader in the domain of public policy popularization, though other donors are involved. USAID has shown it can get results, and other donors, such as the Danes and the European Union, are joining efforts to disseminate understanding of laws with such organizations as RIDD-Fitila, the women's lawyers' association, and the human rights

association. This is the most integrated of the cross-cutting themes, and all SOs have a similar indicator. D/G training programs will also at times be catalysts to integration by placing villagers working in each SO into the same courses.

Adequate funding has been provided for D/G activities to reach our targets. Subject to approval of a continuation plan under Section 508, we expect to be able to continue the training which constitute our measures in this area. It is now even more important, due to the struggle ahead for the pro-democracy forces in Niger.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Strategic Objective 3: Sustained widespread adoption of management practices improving the conservation and productive use of Niger's forests, fields, waters and pastures.									
% of heads of households, both women and men, reporting use of one or more new NRM technologies <sup>1</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Demi-lunes</li><li>• Zai micro-catchments</li><li>• Trees planted</li><li>• Windbreaks</li><li>• Dead or modern fencing</li><li>• Rock dikes</li><li>• Micro-diversion dam</li></ul> Data source: a, b	1996	TBD	‡	‡	‡  m    f 24   11 10   7 54   5 20   0 67   13 30   24 28   14	√	(+5%)	‡ <sup>2</sup>	(+20%)
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> 1995 figures were derived from the pre-test of the National Household NRM Survey which is planned for 1996. Analysis of survey results, and further dialogue with partners, will enable SO3 to refine indicators suggested above. Responding to guidelines suggested in State cable 195086 which describes the USAID management contract with the Niger Mission, SO3 will monitor impact on productivity and environment using the 1996 baseline in conjunction with results of research on productivity and environmental impact of specific practices (see result 3.4A and Hopkins, 1/1996 for discussion). The National Household NRM Survey will make a strong contribution to international efforts to formalize and standardize indicators and methods in this sector. For 1995, SO3 considers it important to report in detail the numerous cases of adoption resulting from our field-level interventions (see discussion below). <sup>2</sup> Data will be gathered on a sub-sample of the national sample of selected off years.									
DATA SOURCE KEY (Source/ Method of data collection/ Frequency of collection): a = Cellule de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (interministerial coordinating unit), Sample survey, Every 4 years b = Ministry of Finance nd Plan, Direction de la Statistique, Sample survey, Every 4 years/Annual c = Cellule de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles, Records review, Annual d = Ministry of Rural Development, Environment and Hydraulics, Environment Division (including National AGRHYMET Center); Records review, Annual e = Ministry of Rural Development, Environment and Hydraulics, Agriculture Division; Records review, Annual					f = Ministry of Finance and Plan - NGO Division, Records review, Annual g =Système d'Alerte Précoce /Gestion des Catastrophes - SAP/GC (early warning and disaster management system), Records review, Annual h = Government of Niger i = Ministry of the Interior, Records review, Annual  TARGET KEY: ‡ = no data collected in this year √= data to be collected in this year				

**ANALYSIS:** SO3 counters the twin scourges of rapid environmental degradation and low productivity by promoting sustained widespread adoption of improved natural resource management practices, easing policy and institutional constraints, strengthening civil society, and providing direct assistance to communities so their members may discover and continue to employ these practices. SO3 also helps sustain the use of appropriate practices by reducing the impact of disasters that can force producers to abandon them.

In 1995, the SO3 team continued improvement of national NRM policy and achievement of substantial field-level impact. As important has been success in building a strong civil society through increased intermediary institution capacity, empowered communities, and the reaffirmation of citizen's rights. With the support of ASDG II, the team's main vehicle addressing policy reform, the GON satisfied the eight conditions precedent to disbursement of Tranche II-A counterpart funds, and achieved substantial progress on Tranche II-B reforms. Success most critical to SO3 in the long term includes: 1) progress defining an approach to formalize decentralized community management of natural resources, including inter-ministerial

agreement and public debates of bills proposed; 2) the execution of the conceptual and practical groundwork necessary to develop a comprehensive national NRM program, including government-wide consensus on responsibilities, and the allocation of staff resources; 3) progress implementing the Rural Code through the finalization of five bills regarding land and resource tenure; and 4) the refinement of an array of information systems tracking and evaluating progress in agriculture and NRM.

The national early warning and disaster response capacity, the *Système d'Alerte Précoce/Gestion de Catastrophes* (SAP/GC), has, through the Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Project, been strengthened to conduct both effective early warning and targeting of vulnerable populations for food for work activities to control erosion and improve the productive capacity of the land. The emergency fund managed by the SAP/GC received two tranches of NPA providing \$3.5 million for these activities.

Years of similar progress on the policy front are complimented by increasing support to civil society institutions. In 1995, the ASDG II Grants Management Unit (GMU) established procedures for soliciting, selecting and evaluating grants to NGOs. The Supervision Committee, composed of representatives from GON, USAID, NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), has reviewed 43 requests, and awarded two grants. This combination of policy reform, support to the NGO and CBO community, and the generalization of vanguard approaches such as the Africare Gouré project, is beginning to pay off in a redefinition of public understanding of the roles of the State and communities. Indicators of this hard to grasp shift include a surge in the number of NGOs, exponential growth of community organizations managing natural resources, and an increased citizen awareness of laws regulating the use and management of natural resources.

Such policy and institutional achievements will maximize the impact of over \$400 million worth of projects (cumulative LOP funding) relating to the management of natural resources currently being implemented in Niger. They will also increase the success of SO3 field-level activities well beyond our already substantial 1995 impact. SO3 supported the adoption of NRM technologies by approximately 360 additional families through the Peace Corps AFSI and NRM programs. This number of new families, with which volunteers have worked, is up from 256 in 1994, and more than doubled the average yearly impact since the 1987 inception of the program and translated into impressive accomplishments in 1995, such as: 20,000 trees planted, 750 people using soil restoration techniques, 21 private or

community gardens established, and 1,430 improved seed loans to women, and 2800 to men.

The Africare Gouré project continues to break new ground in participatory community development. Project staff, working in four new sites this year, has approved 51 activity proposals submitted by elected management committees working under signed contracts. Indicative community results include: the planting of 5,500 trees, and the protection of 7,800 field and pasture trees. Some activities, such as the installation of rock bunds, have been taken over by the villagers themselves.

In 1995, working through the SAP/GC, SO3's DPM project planned and coordinated activities distributing food and materials to food-insecure populations, promoting adoption of good NRM practices, and alleviating malnutrition. SAP/GC activities resulted in the construction of 276 wells, 103,652 demi-lunes, 7 dikes, 15,000 linear meters of trenches, 1,601,000 linear meters of fire breaks, 16,200 linear meters of dead fence, 900 linear meters of live fence, and the planting of 107,650 trees. In addition 51 villages participated in off-season gardening, and the development of three fruit plantations, using 199,000 packets of seed. Three fish farms were established.

Experience and research have demonstrated the potential impact of these practices upon productivity and the environment. Tree planting along field boundaries and in the form of windbreaks has contributed to a 20% increase in yields in the Majjia valley of Niger. Rock bunds, infiltration ditches, stone lines along contours and other soil and water conservation practices have increased yields by over 50% in many sites in Niger and elsewhere in the Sahel. Demi-lunes, zai holes or tassa, in combination with mulching and higher levels of use of manure are helping to reclaim degraded lands and renew soil fertility. Farmers in the departments of Tillabéri and Tahoua have increased yields 2-3 times, from 300 to over 800 kg. of millet/hectare with the use of demi-lunes. Through the use of zai, farmers have produced harvests of 200-600 kg/hectare from land that had been unproductive. In the vicinity of Badaguicheri, degraded sites have been restored and production increased from less than 200 kg/ha to 1500 kg/ha. Protection of regrowth of trees and shrubs in farmfields increases the overall density of vegetative cover, and woodfuel production. It checks wind and water erosion and improves prospects for reversing the steady decline of cropland soil fertility.

**LINKAGES:** In 1995 SO3 contributed to the achievement of SO2 results, by enriching the ongoing national debate on legal reform, with an important assessment the credit union and cooperative movement which was widely



discussed. SO3 has also improved monitoring on credit through inclusion of SO2 related issues in the pre-test for the National Household Survey. Furthermore, GON, in planning for the use of Tranche II-A funds, set aside monies to be contributed to the credit union Guarantee Fund. SO3's support to GON NRM planning reflects field reality—credit is a critical ingredient to increased production, and the adoption of improved practices.

Through the cross-cutting DPM activity, SO3 supports SO1 with resource transfers in an attempt to maintain the nutritional stability of food insecure populations. DPM NPA develops national capacity to respond to disasters, whether health or agriculture related.

**USAID CONTRIBUTION:** SO3 plays a unique and vital role in NRM in Niger. While many donors have NRM projects here, only SO3, through ASDG II, targets national level NRM planning and institutional development. Our efforts improve the context in which other donors implement their field-level activities. They also improve the context for rural producers and community based organizations where no projects are present. As a result of our support to NRM policy, programming, and monitoring, the GON is able to promote coordination of donor efforts and develop new activities based on need, and lessons learned. We contribute to the development of other projects, such as the recently approved \$40 million World Bank project, and get the most out of our field activities by integrating lessons learned on the ground into policy.

While other donors undertake mitigation activities in their specific project zones, USAID, through the SAP/GC, has developed and refined the national system for identifying vulnerable areas; the mitigation activities we fund follow vulnerability, and target the most food insecure areas in the country.

**RESULTS EXPECTED IN 1996, 1997 AND 1998:** The recent *coup d'etat* has resulted in uncertainty concerning the future composition and size of SO3's portfolio. Fortunately, Mission emphasis on collaborative and sustainable progress, and our role as a leader, assures continued progress towards our Strategic Objective, notwithstanding possible partial delays and reduction in our activities in 1996 and 1997. We have led a sea-change in donor and GON understanding of how to go about agricultural development. Our conviction of the importance of our work, and the importance of maintaining the momentum we have built, leads us to expect future results based on a limited reduction in our activities:

The maturation of our current portfolio in 1996 and 1997 will dramatically increase field-level activities. We foresee a jump in adoption rates at sites

directly supported by the Mission as the DPM project activities triple in 1996; the experienced Africare Gouré community organizations undertake ever more activities and the project adds 10 new sites; and as Peace Corps reaches an additional 350 families in 1997 and 200 in 1998. The DPM emergency fund will support at least \$1.5 million in NRM mitigation activities through September of 1996. ASDG II's Grants Management Unit will continue disbursement of \$5.5 million to NGOs and Community Based Organizations. It will also continue to provide intensive capacity building support to the NGO sector. In all, \$10 million in ASDG II counterpart funds remains to be disbursed for activities supporting adoption of practices.

These SO3-supported activities, as well as those of our partners, will be strengthened by years of policy work which are now bearing fruit and help position ASDG II for enormous impact in 1996. In a shift away from budgetary support, SO3 has intensively programmed Tranche II-A counterpart funds \$1.2 million for field activities, and \$1.1 million for technical services operating costs to improve extension, diffuse technical information, and provide training. In 1996, a national program for NRM activities will provide donor and GON coordination, increasing the impact of the scarce resources being applied. In the same year, the NRM Household Survey will give baseline numbers, and, in conjunction with other SO3 supported M&E activities, serve as a powerful information base to help guide decision making. In 1997 the opportunity for official registration will strengthen the hand of community organizations and producers will gain greater control over the resources they depend upon, having increased access to information on land tenure legislation and technical service agents play a less intrusive, more supportive role. By 1998 specific methods for securing tenure will be accessible to an increasing number of producers.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3, RESULT 1

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 3.1: Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.									
A. # of registered community based organizations actively managing natural resources Data source: c, d, e	1995	0 <sup>1</sup>			0	(0)	(35)	(150)	(300 in yr 2000)
B. Cumulative # of community forest management schemes Data source: c, d	1993	14	14	16	28 <sup>2</sup>	(35)	(40)	(50)	(60 in yr 2000)
C. Numbers of hectares under community-managed natural forest management Data source: c,d	1984	0	73,250	225,584	352,000 (113,250)	(400,000)	450,000)	(500,000)	(600,00 in yr 2000)
D. # of registered Nigerien NGOs implementing NRM activities <sup>3</sup> Data source: f	1993	14	14	15	19 (15)	(25)	(30)	(30)	(35)
E. # of sub-regional disaster response committees Data source: g	1994	0			38 <sup>4</sup>	38 (24)	–	–	–
F. % of heads of households, both women and men, aware of new land tenure laws <sup>5</sup> ·Men ·Women Data source: a, b	1996	TBD			m 47% f 42%	(50%) (50%)			(75% in yr 2000) (75% in yr 2000)

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> The 1995 baseline figure of "10" provided in the Performance Monitoring Plan in Niger's CPSP was incorrect. The correct number is "0".

<sup>2</sup> Includes 26 *marché contrôlés* plus 2 other community managed schemes. Improved tracking has identified more schemes than previously thought in existence, and has resulted in a upward revision of the year 2000 target from 25 (as stated in the CPSP Performance Monitoring Plan) to 60.

<sup>3</sup> Measure was broadened to capture NGO all involvement in the NRM sub-sector. Specialization in NRM is neither rapidly increasing, nor imperative.

<sup>4</sup> Target for 1996 was exceeded in 1995. We have achieved total number of sub-regional disaster response committees possible at this time.

<sup>5</sup> 1995 data collected during pre-test survey and represents percent of respondents aware of the Rural Code. The definition of this target has been modified as a result of the development of improved collection methods. A definitive baseline will be proposed in 1996 following a national household survey, rather than through surveying court records, which proved unreliable and elusive. Targets will be finalized once the baseline is determined.

### DISCUSSION:

*Result 3.1A:* SO3 continued to pursue the crucial issue of community empowerment through legal recognition. Despite a variety of informal and *ad hoc* options, Niger's restrictive laws on association contain no provision for the incorporation of a growing number of community NRM organizations. GON data, collected with SO3 support, identifies 199 local organizations managing local natural resources, 34 of which have received Mission

support directly or indirectly. Eighty-nine have resorted to other solutions, and have either registered under cooperative law, or been recognized by the *Prefet*, indicating a readiness among local organizations for incorporation. To support this evolution, SO3 conducted research and sponsored public debates which have clarified options, created consensus, and produced two draft bills.

SO3, through ASDG II, has also continued to build on past reforms to increase the number and strength of cooperatives, many of which play a critical role in the management of natural resources. SO3 supported studies and public debate have pushed the process of finalization for adoption of a new bill regulating cooperatives which will enable them to operate as more democratic, apolitical and voluntary institutions with less intervention from the State. The promulgation of this bill into law will encourage the creation of new cooperatives and strengthen the 419 recognized cooperatives registered to date (2/96).

Half of all DPM NRM mitigation activities originate from village committees, which, in all cases, organize the required amount and period of labor as well as effective distribution of remuneration and serve as liaisons with the technical service agents mobilizing necessary resources. This organization of local populations has to date not resulted in the formation of registered community institutions. However, these mitigation interventions, often located in the most environmentally devastated areas of Niger, provide experience and successful examples for nascent community organizations.

This target was designed to track long term evolution in the area we have identified with our partners as most critical -- the establishment of a means for *formal recognition* of community based NRM organizations -- and has illustrated a proliferation in non-registered community based organizations. The fact that there are currently almost 200 community organizations managing natural resources -- as well as the fact that there is general consensus concerning the need to formally recognize such organizations -- can be attributed in large part to Mission work over the past fifteen years.

USAID/Niger has played a central role in helping establish enabling conditions for local resources management and in testing and proving concepts in the field. Many of the models developed with USAID support have now become key elements of the approaches on which Niger's NRM strategy is based.

Early Mission efforts addressed the enabling conditions for the development of viable rural organizations through its support of cooperatives and rural credit institutions. In the 80s and early 90s, through studies, workshops and policy dialogue, the Mission coaxed the GON to liberalized laws, and bring the cooperative movement away from a system of feeble state-created politicized institutions, towards apolitical, voluntary organization. ASDG I supported studies pushed the GON to close the bankrupt and inefficient central agricultural credit facility and allow credit union development. The first non-governmental credit associations in Niger were introduced by the USAID funded WOCCU project, which led the way in demonstrating what

was possible. Through ASDG II, the Mission keeps the pressure on, with conditions precedent tied to progress in the field, and the establishment of a \$1 million guarantee fund for rural credit.

To complement progress in the liberalization of the regulation of rural associations, USAID policy dialog efforts have also helped create a consensus around the community-based approach to the management of natural resources, supporting major policy declarations, as well as specific pilot demonstration projects: the sixth tranche of ASDG I and the ASDG II NGO fund support a number such efforts, and our current Africare project provides a model example.

*Result 3.1B:* SO3 continues to support the spread of community forestry, initially pioneered in Niger by the Mission. To date, 28 communities actively manage their forests. An additional 48 communities actively protect their community forests and harvest controlled volumes of wood from designated areas. SO3 technical assistance has clarified national options for policy and institutional reform through the completion of a major study on the role of the forestry agent, whose recommendations were presented at a national workshop before adoption by the GON. SO3 has also provided counterpart funds with which the GON has assisted 12 community groups managing forest resources. The SO3 team collaborates with the World Bank Energy II project, the largest project in Niger supporting community forest management. Schemes supported by this one project alone cover more than 350,000 hectares of forest, forest that would otherwise have been cleared by wood merchants, but now is being controlled more sustainably by local communities that use the revenues to finance their own development activities.

*Result 3.1C:* A decade worth of Mission-led effort is now paying off in a rapid proliferation of Nigerien NGOs. USAID has supported this growth through training, financial support, workshops, and, especially, policy dialogue resulting in a liberalization of NGO regulations and a generalized recognition of the importance of these intermediary organizations. Through the ASDG II Grants Management Unit, SO3 provides capacity building support, as well as grants, to these young organizations. The Ministry of Plan's computerized directory, developed with ASDG II assistance, reports a jump from 14 Nigerien NGOs in 1990 to the current total of 122. Of the 38 considered to be actively implementing projects, 19 of these work in NRM and environmental activities.

The community management of natural forests approach was pioneered in the Sahel by the activities of Niger Forest and Land Use Project (FLUP, began 1980) in the forest of Guesselbodi. The FLUP Project still produces

dividends outside as well as inside the borders of Niger. ASDG II is an instrument that allows continued capitalization on this investment. The FLUP Project pioneered a number of ideas, approaches, and concepts that are having profound and fundamental changes in the way farmers, governments, and donors act toward natural forests in West Africa. For example, Burkina Faso and Benin are using natural forest management in national forests. Examples of the enabling conditions being established in Niger and/or the larger subregion:

Changes in fiscal policy have directly linked the sale of fuelwood with investments back into the forest. From another perspective, this means that increased markets for fuelwood mean increased investments in forest management. A result being experienced in some places is that communities have increased their revenues while the forest cover has increased.

Changes have occurred in the relationships between communities and governments. Prior to the FLUP Project, all cutting was done by people who received their permits from the Forest Service. The people who lived and made their living in the cutting area often received no benefits and had few, if any, incentives to protect or otherwise husband the woodlands. Consequently, there was no one in who was directly interested in protecting or responsibly managing the forest resources. FLUP broke the ice and demonstrated the advantages of community-government partnerships where both shared responsibility and benefits.

Changes have also occurred in the role of forestry agents. In the FLUP project, forestry agents worked for and with community members in developing and implementing plans. Prior to this, forestry agents had police roles and were associated with levying fines and not with protecting property.

*Result 3.1D:* There are now 38 Sub-Regional Early Warning and Emergency Planning Committees (*Cellule Sous-Regional* SAP-GC), one in each of the 38 arrondissements. There are also seven regional-level committees and several urban community committees as well. These committees serve as the critical link between the local self-governing village committees, and the national SAP/GC. They are responsible for 1) early warning, follow up vulnerability assessment, and food distribution monitoring and verification; 2) emergency planning and response; and 3) coordination of the design of mitigation activities. They are composed of up to fifteen members, most of whom are drawn from the sub-regional (arrondissement) administrative and technical staff. The core membership of the committee is composed of the *Sous-Prefet*, the representatives of the

services of Plan, Agriculture, Livestock, Health, Environment, the local Gendarme Brigade Commander, representatives of other local services and members of the community. In 1995 they have all been trained in vulnerability assessment, project design and financial management. They represent no additional cost to the SAP/GC system of the project.

*Result 3.1E:* In 1995, the SO3 Team helped the GON refine and finalize for presentation to the Prime Minister's office five of the texts necessary to implement the legislation reforming land and natural resource management, the Rural Code. The diffusion of these laws will be an ongoing process. While almost as many women as men have heard of the Rural Code, women's understanding of the specifics lags behind. Of those who know about the Rural Code, 93% of men surveyed and 85% of women knew of its application to farmer/herder relationships. 88% of men and 64% of women knew of the Code goal to reduce conflict. One principal actor promoting popular understanding of the evolving legislation in 1995 has been the Mission-supported Nigerien NGO, RIDD-Fitila, which, since the 1993 inception of its village law program, has presented the Rural Code to 1,700,000 people in public sessions.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3, RESULT 2

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 3.2: Increased producer access to technical information.									
A. % of heads of households, both women and men, able to identify at least one new NRM method  Data source: a, b	1996	TBD			m 24 f 33 <sup>1</sup>	√	m (25%) f (25%)	m (30%) f (25%)	m (40%) f (40%)
B. % of heads of households, both women and men, in communities targeted by NRM projects, able to describe at least one NRM practice used in another village <sup>2</sup>  Data source: a, b	1996	TBD			m 36% f 21% <sup>3</sup>	measure to be modified			
C. % of heads of households, both women and men, in target communities with access to market and climatic reporting services • Market • Climatic  Data source: a, b	1996	TBD			m f 71 52% 86 79%				m f (80) (75) (85) (80)
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> 1995 data collected in pre-test survey and reflects the number of practices known by over 25% of respondents. Analysis of pre-test results and further dialogue with partners will enable a definition of new methods, and the tracking of the indicator as it was originally stated. <sup>2</sup> 1995 data collected in pre-test survey and reflects the percentage of respondents citing another village as the major source of information about NRM practices. Research following the National Household Survey Pre-test results will lead to the redefinition of this indicator. Pre-test efforts revealed the indicator as stated is difficult to assess with reliability. <sup>3</sup> 1995 data collected in pre-test survey and reflects percent of practices respondents learned from another village but do not use, Baseline data to be collected in 1996.									

### DISCUSSION:

**Result 3.2A&B:** Results of the National Household pre-test indicate that rural producers are aware of a vast array of techniques; 37 practices were named by over a quarter of the women interviewed (33 for the men interviewed). Projects were reported as the source of an awareness of a third of total practices known. Through a range of field activities employing a variety of approaches, SO3 has contributed strongly to the extension of new technologies. Through DPM, SO3 has provided 338 communities with technical NRM guidance. All DPM mitigation interventions are conducted jointly with local populations and the relevant GON technical agents working at the local level. Technical guidance on successful implementation of the mitigation intervention is provided regularly throughout the implementation period. Peace Corps has volunteers stationed in 87 communities; and Africare worked

intensively in 16 villages in Gouré and 6 villages in Agadez. ASDG I funds have supported projects extending NRM technologies in a total of 290 communities.

**Result 3.2C:** Possible SO3 efforts to address this result are being assessed. Market information is regularly transmitted nationally in French, Hausa, and Djerma. For climatic information, the crop protection farmer's and gardeners training module does not include the climatic information. However, meetings with the Radio Club association to find out the best way to directly transmit the climatic information to farmers resulted in a solution that seems workable. Radio Club can meet with the Meteorological Service, C/GRN and the Direction of Crop Protection to set up a program which will improve the access of producers to climatic information.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3, RESULT 3

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual <Estimate> (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 3.3: Increased capital available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices.									
A. Level of financing of projects promoting community-level NRM activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Value of life of project funding for projects begun this year (millions of dollars)</li><li>Number of active NRM related projects with a life of project funding greater than \$500,000</li><li>Number of grants of less than \$500,000 awarded community based organizations and NGOs for NRM projects</li></ul> Data source: c	1993	32.4	32.4	8.1	65.3  42 <sup>1</sup>  32 <sup>2</sup>	  (45)  (40)	  (50)  (50)	  (50)  (60)	  (55)  (65)
B. % of heads of households, both women and men, reporting access to funds Data source: a, b	1996	TBD			m 35% f 52% <sup>3</sup>	√			
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Source: "Liste des projets ayant un rapport avec la gestion des ressources naturelles" C/GRN, ASDG II database printout 2/96. <sup>2</sup> Source: "Tableau des organisations non-gouvernementales et groupements prives ayant reçu ou recevant un appui financier en matiere de GRN et developpement rural." GMU/ASDG II database printout, 2/21/96. Only grants with activities ongoing in 1995 were included. Project types included: land use management, soil conservation/reclamation, livestock fattening, gardening, local wells, etc. Not included were classic livestock, agriculture, milling, credit and cereal bank projects. <sup>3</sup> 1995 data, collected in the pre-test survey, reflects percent of respondents who received credit 2-3 times in the year prior to the pre-test survey. Baseline data to be collected in 1996.									

### DISCUSSION:

**Result 3.3A:** While factors beyond the control of any one donor influence funding levels, expressed above in dollar amount of starts of new projects relating to NRM, SO3 contribution to National NRM planning achieves results far beyond our dollar contribution. SO3 has improved the data-collection for project planning; our technical assistance contributes to the development of other donors' projects, and ASDG II counterpart funds have been used to leverage other donor projects. Most important is the support to NRM and environmental planning and programming—the creation of a national institution, the C/GRN, capable of developing and coordinating a coherent NRM program for the country.

For our own part, ASDG II Tranche II-A, satisfied in 1995, provides \$1.2 million for investment in NRM programs and \$1.1 million for operating costs

of technical services providing support for NRM practice adoption. \$2.2 million from ASDG II, of a total \$5.5 million, has been made available for grants to NGO and community based projects. To date, \$403,000 has been awarded, and \$38,500 has been approved for disbursement. Through ASDG I, SO3 provided over \$400,000 financing NRM projects. Through the DPM project SO3 provided \$801,500 for direct support of field activities, and through the Africare Gouré project, \$280,000. Peace Corps spent \$174,000 in 55 projects.

*Result 3.3B:* SO3 continues to work with SO2 to improve rural producer access to funds for possible investment in NRM both through credit institutions, and through NRM project activities. In 1995 SO3 conducted an exhaustive study of cooperatives in Niger, and Tranche II includes a \$1 million guarantee fund to drive the establishment of community-level

credit institutions. The pre-test survey results show that all respondents received credit in cash last year at least once, most of this from an individual (non-spouse) and 17% through a local (project supported or created) institution. Counting all sources, 35% of men and 52% of women received credit 2-3 times in the year prior to the pre-test survey.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3, RESULT 4

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 3.4: National capacity to promote and sustain results 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is improved.									
A. Implementation of a national-scale short-term impact monitoring system and application by GON and NGOs Data source: b					pre-test successfully implemented	target completion date			
B. Creation of a national NRM plan by GON with donor approval Data source: b						target completion date			
C. Creation of national Disaster Response Coordination Unit by GON Data source: g, h						target completion date			
D. Creation of national Disaster Plan by GON Data source: g, h			40%	40%	60%	target completion date <sup>1</sup>			
E. GON authorization for local-level disbursement of funds Data source: g, h					30%	60%	target completion date <sup>1</sup>		
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> 1993, 1994, and 1995 figures represent cumulative effort expressed as percent towards completion of activity .									

## DISCUSSION:

*Result 3.4A:* The successful development and execution of the National NRM Household Survey pre-test has provided SO3 with suggestive, though not baseline, figures relating to a number of targets, including an inventory of adoption rates of over 50 techniques, disaggregated by gender and project or non-project zone. After the intensive process of developing the questionnaire in collaboration with our partners, 135 men and 134 women in 18 villages in three agricultural zones were surveyed. Further preparation

for the National Survey includes analysis of pre-test results and discussions with our partners, to develop a short list of specific, clearly defined practices to track, to simplify results reporting and to facilitate the creation of a definitive baseline in 1996. SO3 also progressed on a number of other fronts, such as the development of a unified monitoring system for NGOs, development of a national NRM monitoring system, refining cutting edge monitoring technology through work with videography, and defining research institution contribution to NRM evaluation.

**Result 3.4B:** SO3 supported the GON in making significant progress in planning a coordinated NRM program. The team laid the groundwork necessary for hammering out the program document, including the identification and redefinition of the mandate of the lead structure, and allocating it the necessary staff, the drafting of the terms of reference for the production of the document, and discussions and networking leading to a common understanding among the various technical services and institutions to be involved, and the necessary work to integrate the planning process in the larger process of developing a National Plan for the Environment and Sustainable Development.

**Result 3.4C:** The GON's national early warning system, the *Comité National du Système d'Alerte Précoce* (CN/SAP), was established in 1989. Composed of high-level officials from several ministries, its operating arm, the *Secrétariat Permanent du Système d'Alerte Précoce* (SAP) receives data collected by various information systems, analyzes it to identify the portion of the population most vulnerable to post-harvest famine in a given year. In May 1995, the CN/SAP's mandate was broadened by GON decree to include coordination of disaster response efforts, including emergency assistance and mitigation of conditions threatening highly vulnerable populations. CN/SAP was renamed *Comité*

*National du Système d'Alerte Précoce/Gestion de Catastrophes* (CN/SAP/GC). The SAP/GC was responsible for coordinating the mitigation activities reported under Results 3.1.

**Result 3.4D:** The National Disaster Plan will provide the institutional framework and operational plan necessary for effective management of localized or national disasters, including the roles of local administrative and elected authorities and populations in the use of external, central or local resources for emergency or mitigation interventions. A draft institutional framework and background legal texts have been developed and circulated among CN/SAP/GC partners to vet and refine these drafts. Additional studies will be undertaken within the next months to define disaster intervention thresholds and to further refine the methodology by which the level of vulnerability to famine is identified.

**Result 3.4E:** The National Assembly passed law no. 94-028 outlining the responsibilities of decentralized, elected authorities, and elections for local councils are scheduled to take place prior to October 1996. In the meantime, DPM has provided extensive training and obtained ministerial permission to task the Ministry of Finance and Planning technical agents at the arrondissement-level to manage mitigation funds and to account for expenditures and procurement integrity. Procedures are being developed for regional SAP/GC committees to manage limited portions of the Emergency Fund for localized mitigation and relief use.

## PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR SO3, RESULT 5

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	BASELINE DATA		1993 Actual	1994 Actual	1995 Actual (Target)	1996 (Target)	1997 (Target)	1998 (Target)	1999 (Target)
	YEAR	VALUE							
Result 3.5: A public well informed of key policies and legislation affecting citizens' rights and responsibilities.									
A. # of local councils trained in local governance and local policy issues in target areas of SO3 <sup>1</sup> Data source: i	1996	TBD				5%	35%	40%	100%
B. % of heads of households, both women and men, aware of new land tenure laws <sup>2</sup> ·Men ·Women Data source: a, c	1996	TBD			m 47% f 42%	(50%)			(75% by 2000)
NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Results for this measure are based on the assumption that local and municipal elections are held in 1996. Activities have not yet begun. <sup>2</sup> See 3.1e									



### SECTION III: THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT & SPECIAL ISSUES

This Section provides supplementary information about the USAID/Niger program context. Some minor modifications and refinements to the "management contract" between the USAID/Niger mission and headquarters are highlighted—those that might affect understandings about what the Niger program is expected to achieve, and the fit of our approach and indicators with those recently prepared for overall Agency reporting.<sup>13</sup> Also, throughout 1995, USAID/Niger was deeply involved as a Country Experimental Laboratory (CEL) in the U.S. Government's "Reinventing Government" initiative. The reengineering experience during 1995 altered the way we do Agency business in Niger.<sup>14</sup>

#### **The Management Contract**

USAID/Niger presented its reengineered Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP) to USAID/W in April 1995. It was approved after negotiations between Mission representatives and USAID/W staff improved the logic and brought Objectives indicators into close sync with headquarter's ideas and priorities. Joint work on SO1's (Population and Health) indicators, especially, were productive and an outcome satisfactory to all parties—including the Mission's partners in Niger—was reached. Concerns surrounding SO2 (Economic Reform and Microenterprise Development) were substantial. USAID/W questioned the viability of this SO and determined that final approval for the Mission to proceed with a Strategic Objective Agreement with the GON should be delayed pending additional sectoral analyses. The statement of SO3 Natural Resources Management objective, indicators, and targets were approved as proposed in the CPSP, though target dates were extended and a useful modification was suggested for the SO's measure of performance to include direct estimation of impact of NRM practices on agricultural production through special studies.

In August 1995, STATE 195086 notified the Mission that its Strategic Plan had been approved by AA/AFR, John Hicks, and complimented the Mission on an excellent submission, "particularly impressive as this was the first Africa strategy prepared under the reengineering guidelines." The cable stated that once certain issues were resolved and appropriate changes were integrated into the Plan, the Mission had the authority to develop and sign strategic objective agreements (SOAGs) for SO1 and SO3 with the GON. This cable constituted USAID/Niger's management contract with Washington.

The cable confirmed prior consensus reached between USAID/Niger and USAID/W regarding SOs 1 and 2. Paragraph 7 regarding SO3, however, renewed a challenge to the mission by restating AFR/DP's view that, since the Mission had been working in the agricultural sector for some years, we should be "at a stage where adoption of improved practices can be correlated with increases in production", and that we should go beyond the CPSP's behavioral indicators

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<sup>13</sup> See, "The Agency's Strategic Framework and Indicators", September 1995, PPC/CDIE.

<sup>14</sup> The approach within USAID was to try to systematically apply the best of what is being learned in U.S. corporate restructuring to the operations of government. USAID became one of the first major agencies of the USG to undertake "reengineering", and the Niger mission was among the first operating units within the Agency to become a testing ground, based on application of the "Operations Business Area Analysis" (October 1994).

("adoption of NRM practices") and "include performance measures relating to production...and (show) some magnitude of impact reported in terms of additional yields". In response to the cable and follow-up discussions with USAID/W, the Mission is pursuing a middle ground approach which it believes fully meets the intent of the challenge (study and verify the correlation), but does not deeply distort the logic and approach of the strategy nor program management. The R2 exercise provides an opportunity to revisit this contract issue and renew consensus.

In the Mission's view, the substance of the issue is that through many months of analysis and program development, USAID/Niger and its technical consultants had determined that the Mission's plan should depend upon demonstrating results in changing the *behaviors* of rural producers with respect to natural resource management. The cable reintroduced the prospects of the Mission being responsible for measuring changes in actual rural production, over which USAID inputs may have little or no control, for reasons spelled out in the cable. Further, although this *research* issue is interesting and important, as an indicator, crop production logically rests at the *goal* or vision level (e.g., "agricultural growth") and not at the *objectives* level. Tracking production yields is not, as a matter of strategy, in this Mission's manageable interests within the contract framework, nor is the proposed change to the indicator system necessary to get at the research issues. When this issue was introduced by the Mission in the final reviews, we drew a comparison between the family planning (FP) and NRM domains: in SO1 everyone agreed that our objective is to increase the practice of family planning; lowering fertility is at the goal level. We will from time to time, as possible in periodic survey research, examine the relationship between fertility and the use of contraception, but studying that correlation is not our purpose. The same holds for our objective in NRM. Production is absolutely the vital outcome we seek, but it is not the manageable *objective* around which we organize work for results measurable within a planning period. This point can easily be lost or ignored if a team is not being held directly accountable for results.

However, to deal with USAID/W concerns, the Mission is proposing to preserve its "manageable interests" focus by holding to behavioral changes at the objectives level and with respect to indicators. Special studies will be undertaken along the lines proposed by AFR/SD to permit measurement of "intra-annual differences in yields and degradation of the land of users and non-users". Intensive consultation has provided a several-pronged approach to utilizing existing research from ICRISAT and others, and adapting a proposed national sample survey to serve the purpose of estimating production. Ways are being explored to estimate soil degradation.

No other important alterations were proposed, nor have any been made, in the substance of the SOs or Results approved in the CPSP, although some improvements to the definition of certain indicators in each of the SOs have been made to provide a more exact, accurate picture of what it is we're trying to achieve and measure. The best example of this is in SO1 Result 4, where we have considerably extended the results framework that integrates disaster prevention and mitigation (DPM) into the child survival objective. Food security and related concerns now are better woven into SO1, innovatively building on the consultations, especially with AFR/SD, begun during the USAID/W CPSP reviews.

A note on the relationship between Niger's CPSP objectives and indicators and those schematized in PPC's Agency Framework (Sept 1995): we find that, for all practical purposes, the Niger Mission's objectives, indicators and approaches converge very well with Agency priorities, and believe that Niger's reporting will contribute positively to overall Agency reporting requirements. Our Mission has chosen, after subjecting our strategy formulation to thorough "reinvention" processes, to concentrate on behavior change and human practices. In comparing our approach to the PPC schema, we note that the latter often includes for its objectives the same types of indicators that we have placed at the goal level. We believe that this difference probably accurately reflects Niger's comparative level on key, standard indicators of development. For example, as levels of education and childhood immunizations increase, there is a natural tendency to think that USAID activities will directly affect mortality rates within reasonable planning periods of eight to ten years. This does not yet hold for a development program in Niger.

## Reengineering and USAID/NIGER

As a country experimental laboratory (CEL), USAID/Niger helped break new ground for the Agency by developing models of a reengineered strategic plan, Strategic Objective Agreement and Request for Proposals (RFP), as well as a model for the reorganization of staff by strategic objective teams. Through its CEL activities, USAID/Niger has assisted USAID in moving towards the primary objective of the Agency's reengineering initiative: the establishment of a more effective, more participatory, and more efficient means for achieving sustainable development results.

The Experiment: USAID/Niger was approved as a CEL in August 1994. As a lab, the Mission agreed to test the principles, concepts and approaches upon which the Agency has based its new operations system. Although the Mission had produced a draft Country Program Strategy Plan by October of 1994, after becoming a CEL the Mission decided not to submit that document for formal review. Instead, taking full advantage of its lab status, the Mission decided to focus its reengineering experiment on revisiting the foundations of its proposed SOs by reviewing the strategy with its partners, customers and stakeholders.

Through the experiment the Mission hoped to establish how and/or if a participatory strategic planning process improves the relationship between USAID and its partners, customers and stakeholders, and whether or not a plan designed with partner and customer input is more likely to produce sustainable development results. The outcome was a plan that not only integrated partner and customer perspectives and priorities into the content of the Plan, but a planning process which secured partner and customer commitment to contribute to subsequent implementation of the Plan. Furthermore, as a result of the highly participatory planning process—which included cross-fertilization of ideas and broad participation within the Mission as well as outside of the Mission— the Plan has three SOs and three cross-cutting issues which are so closely interwoven that it called for the establishment of a new Mission structure in order to effectively carry it out. Therefore, in addition to strategic planning, one could say that over the course of 1995 the Mission also experimented with reorganization by SO and Results Package (RP) teams, SOAGs, RFPs, empowerment, managing for results....basically putting the entire new operations system into effect piece by piece.

The Strategic Objective Agreement: In August 1995, upon receipt of the Management Contract, the Mission proceeded with the development of a Strategic Objective Agreement for SO1. USAID/Niger's SO1 SOAG captures both the intent and nuances of reengineering, and can be used by other operating units working to apply the new guidance.

USAID/Niger's SOAG for SO1 includes explicit language concerning the four core values and defines the Mission's family planning and maternal/child health services program in terms of activities which will be funded through Results Packages and carried out by teams. The Agreement details (1) the performance measures which the two parties have agreed to work together to achieve; (2) targets and indicators; (3) the GON's role in measuring progress towards the achievement of the objective; and (4) the financial contributions to be made by USAID and the GON. While the SOAG indicates that over the course of the life of the SO USAID/Niger plans to contribute US\$64 million to achieve the objective, it also specifies that with the signing of the SOAG, the US government has obligated only the first US\$3.9 million increment. It clearly states that in subsequent years the SOAG may be amended to reflect future obligations subject to the availability of funds, progress towards the SO and targets to date, and the mutual agreement of the two parties. A major innovation is that the SOAG encompasses the possibility of Non-Project Assistance, but leaves the details of such a program to subsequent amendments.

The SOAG's amplified program description and the Implementation Letter both discuss the role of the core values in program implementation. The program description also contains the SO's results framework and specifies that the Ministry of Public Health, which has primary responsibility for implementing health related activities in Niger, will be responsible for chairing the Strategic Objective Team which has overall responsibility for achievement of the objective.

While preparing the SOAG document, the Mission became concerned about the fact that reengineering does not provide for any organized, "official" means of accounting for all of the analyses (611a, statutory checklist, environmental waivers) that would normally have been included as part of a project paper. The SO1 Team, therefore, defined its own mechanism for officially verifying that all legal requirements had been met so that USAID could proceed with an obligation of funds. An Action Memorandum was transmitted to the Mission Director along with the SOAG requesting that the Director (1) sign the SOAG, and (2) verify that all the required analyses, copies of which were attached to the memo, had been completed. Thus, when the Mission Director signed the Action Memo he not only agreed to sign the SOAG, but he approved the acceptance of all pertinent supporting analyses and documentation.

It should be noted that USAID/Niger's government counterparts had been deeply involved in the formulation of SO1 and the results framework which supports the SO. Therefore, when the time came to sign an SO Agreement there was actually little left to negotiate. The Mission and the GON quickly reached a common understanding of each of their roles and responsibilities in achieving the SO and within one month of receiving the Management Contract, the SOAG had been successfully drawn up and signed.

The RFP: Another major USAID/Niger accomplishment in 1995 was the development of a reengineered, performance-based Request for Proposals (RFP). Even before the signing of the SOAG, the extended SO1 Team began working on an RFP which exemplified the essence of reengineering by focusing on results to be achieved rather than inputs/outputs and shifting the design process from the Mission to the contractor. In contrast to the past, in which USAID RFPs set forth those specific activities a contractor was expected to carry out and the contractor responded with a price estimate of how much it would cost to carry out such activities; in this instance, USAID/Niger identified the set of development results it wants to achieve in support of its SO and asked the contractors to propose how they would achieve the results and the estimated cost. Unfortunately, the offerors' responses did not correspond to the new, reengineered style of the RFP. The proposals received followed the old format and, ultimately, had to be rejected.

The Reorganization: USAID/Niger has made a successful transition from a Mission organized by discrete offices to a more integrated structure which centers around Strategic Objective Teams. This new organization maximizes staff talents and knowledge by bringing together individuals from each of the Mission's divisions—including functional offices—in a unified effort to achieve results. The conversion to the team structure has resulted in impressive changes. Everyone in the Mission acknowledges that they now have a better idea of what is going on in the rest of the Niger program because representatives from each of the offices and teams either serve on or attend meetings of other teams. Mission staff now talk regularly to people they never dealt with before, exchanging information that they previously hadn't realized could be valuable to others. Adding staff from the Offices of Financial and Administrative Management to the teams has been, perhaps, the biggest improvement over the old system, as people who were never involved in program activities in the past are now willing and able to help solve problems and provide ideas and explanations.

Conclusion: When the Mission reflects upon the relative ease and speed with which a SOAG was developed and signed and considers the positive experiences some of the SO Teams have had in working with their partners to develop Results Package teams—it becomes clear that as a result of the participatory nature of the planning process our partners now have a clearer understanding of USAID priorities, support the Mission's objectives, and will work cooperatively to achieve commonly desired results. Furthermore, the deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing nature of the Mission's objectives and of the activities which support key results necessitates that the entire Mission work as a team—sharing information, responsibility and accountability for achieving the Mission's objectives.

## **Environmental Issues and Schedule**

### **I. Issues related to implementation requirements under 22 CFR 216:**

USAID/Niger is not aware of any issues pertaining to requirements under 22 CFR 216 which need to be addressed at this time by USAID/W or the Mission.

In early 1995, REDSO/WA and AFR/SD certified a Section 118/119 appraisal that supported the Mission's Strategic Plan. Pertinent excerpts:

"USAID/Niger's program has long recognized that resource degradation is one of the important constraints with regard to Niger's development....the Mission program has been consistent with measures required for the conservation of the resource base, including tropical forests and biodiversity...Over 30 years of declining rainfall, punctuated by two severe droughts, a population growth of over three percent and expanding agriculture, have had a severe impact upon Niger's forests and biodiversity. Forest cover and natural habitat have declined with official protected areas subject to intense pressure from grazing, wood harvesting and clearing for agriculture. One example of these effects is the classified forest cover in the Department of Tahoua, In 1954 forests covered an area of 11,659 hectares, today the cover is 4,500 hectares...While not having conducted a tropical forest assessment per se, the Mission has since the mid-1970s been actively involved with issues of forest conservation and management. Forests are of economic importance to Niger, providing 100% of rural energy needs, wood and grass for construction, watershed protection, grazing and natural habitat for much of the country's biodiversity. The demand for fuelwood (fueled by increasing population growth), expanding agriculture, grazing and 30 years of low rainfall and severe drought have combined to drastically reduce overall forest cover...USAID/Niger sponsored Niger's first formal biodiversity assessment in 1991. This provided a general overview of the state of the country's biodiversity, its' economic value and use and institutional questions with respect to the conservation of biological diversity...Present and past Mission interventions have supported programs and activities aimed at slowing and/or reversing resource degradation. These approaches have directly or indirectly supported the conservation of natural habitat and/or its exploitation in a rational and sustainable manner." (from Strategic Plan, 1995-2002, Annex H)

II. Preliminary list of Initial Environmental Examinations or Environmental Assessments to be performed in the upcoming year:

In developing the SO1 SOAG for USAID/Niger's Population and Health Program, a determination was made to defer the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) until after the SOAG was signed in September, 1995. The IEE has not yet been carried out and will be scheduled following the submission of the Mission's Windup and Continuation Plan.

For SO2 (Economic Reform and Microenterprise Development) and SO3 (Natural Resources Management), the Mission had intended to schedule IEEs before signing the two SOAGs. However, due to the military coup and application of Foreign Assistance Act Section 508, SO2 has been discontinued and SO3 activities have been suspended. Assuming a democratically elected government is restored to power, the Mission will revisit SO3 and the development of the SO3 SOAG in order to determine the appropriate approach to perform an IEE for SO3.

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